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Abstract 
Hiring decision-making is heavily based on intuition-based approaches (e.g., expert 
judgment, group consensus meetings) despite extensive research supporting the use of 
analytical approaches (e.g., algorithms, statistical equations). Both individual level and 
organizational level factors contribute to practitioners’ resistance to using statistical 
methods. Given that the reliance on human intuition is likely to persist, it is important to 
identify interventions that improve the accuracy of human judgment when making hiring 
decisions. The purpose of this study is to examine the effectiveness of eliciting a 
favorable anchoring effect to improve hiring decisions. Although the anchoring effect is a 
common decision bias, it may increase the accuracy of human predictions, which are 
aligned with the anchors, if the anchors are valid predictions of the outcome. Specifically, 
four questions are examined: 1) Does providing decision makers with external 
predictions (i.e., anchors) affect the decision policy and the accuracy of human 
judgment? 2) Do features of the anchors (i.e., source and precision) affect the degree of 
anchoring and the accuracy of human judgment? 3) Do individual differences predict 
anchoring susceptibility? and 4) Do individual differences interact with anchor features 
when predicting the degree of anchoring? Results showed that providing decision makers 
with external predictions as a decision aid induced favorable anchoring. Furthermore, it 
increased the consistency and accuracy of human judgment as well as influenced the 
weighting policy of decision makers. The more precise the anchors were, the stronger the 
anchoring effect was. Knowing the source of the anchors did not affect the degree to 
which decision makers adopted the anchors. Different effects of anchor features were 
observed when predicting accuracy: when anchors were presented at a precise level, 
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individuals who were informed that the anchors were provided by an expert showed 
lower accuracy than those who were informed that the anchors were obtained from a 
statistical formula. In fact, there was only a weak linear association between degree of 
anchoring and accuracy because individuals could outperform the suboptimal anchors 
(i.e., unit-weighted composites of the predictors) presented to them. Exploratory analyses 
revealed that stronger anchoring led to higher accuracy only when individuals did not 
develop a better weighting schema than unit weighting. When individuals were able to 
apply a weighting schema that was more accurate than unit weighting, weaker anchoring 
implied reasonable adjustment and thus higher accuracy. Prior experience with employee 
selection predicted anchoring susceptibility such that individuals with more prior 
experience showed weaker anchoring. Cognitive ability interacted with the source of 
anchors when predicting anchoring such that higher cognitive ability was related to 
weaker anchoring only when individuals were informed that the anchors were obtained 
from a statistical formula. 
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Literature Review 
Despite the extensive research that mechanical (i.e., statistical) combinations of 
predictors are consistently equal to or superior to human judgment (e.g., Grove, Zald, 
Lebow, Snitz, & Nelson, 2000), most decisions made in work settings are heavily based 
on human intuition. Various explanations have been offered to explain the resistance to 
mechanical methods1. Besides apparent factors, such as lacking knowledge and education 
of statistical methods (Vrieze & Grove, 2009) and belief in human intuition (Highhouse, 
2008), there are contextual reasons for this resistance. In an employment setting, 
selection is fundamentally a sociopolitical process (Cleveland & Murphy, 1992). 
Organizational factors, such as politics and culture, also promote the use of human 
judgment while discouraging the use of purely statistical methods (Johns, 1993; 
Muchinsky, 2004; Terpstra & Rozell, 1997).  
Given that relying solely on statistical methods, especially in high-stakes settings, 
is unlikely as a practical matter, it is crucial to understand what interventions may help 
decision makers effectively integrate data and make more accurate judgments in the 
context of hiring decision-making. Ideally, such an approach would preserve the 
predictive power of an algorithmic method while remaining acceptable to end users. 
																																																								1	Sawyer (1966) distinguished between mode of data collection and mode of data combination. 
This study is focused on comparisons of clinical and mechanical methods of data combination. 
Mechanical methods refer to any processes involving integrating data with consistent rules (e.g., 
algorithms, statistical equations, models of human judges, etc.), regardless of whether the data is 
collected clinically (e.g., interviews) or statistically (e.g., psychometric tests). 
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Evidence suggests that interventions such as task-related feedback and training on cue 
weighting strategies affect human judgment but improvements in accuracy are typically 
small (Harding, 2004; Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008). Practically speaking, immediate 
feedback is rarely available to decision makers after making hiring decisions since there 
is often a time lag between when the decision is made and when the criterion can be 
measured. In some cases, the decision maker will have no contact with the employee after 
the decision is made. Similarly, although research suggests it can be helpful to provide 
judges with training on domain-specific knowledge, such as how predictors are 
associated with the criterion or how predictors should be integrated statistically, the 
practical challenge is that developing and implementing such training can be costly and 
time-consuming.  
A major obstacle to improving hiring decision-making is that human judges are 
subject to a range of decision biases. According to the theory of bounded rationality, 
human judgment is rational only within the limitations imposed by the amount of 
information they have and the cognitive capacities of their minds (Simon, 1955). To cope 
with these limitations when making decisions, instead of using more complex rules and 
algorithms, individuals tend to use fast heuristics to reduce the complexity of decision 
processes. Heuristics refer to methods that allow individuals to reach satisfactory 
solutions with modest amounts of processing (Simon, 1990). Examples include 
representativeness, availability, and anchoring-and-adjustment heuristics (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). Although heuristics allow individuals to make decisions in a less 
effortful manner and are sometimes useful, they can lead to systematic biases. For 
instance, the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic refers to the tendency of decision 
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makers to make judgments biased toward an initially presented value (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). Although individuals do adjust from the starting value, the 
adjustments are typically insufficient. If the initially presented value is biased or 
irrelevant to the target judgment, the human judgment fixated on the anchor will also be 
biased.  
The anchoring heuristic is a ubiquitous phenomenon in human judgment. Efforts 
have been devoted to mitigating the anchoring effect (e.g., Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; 
Mussweiler, Strack, & Pfeiffer, 2000) but the effect remains robust. If we cannot 
effectively prevent it, can we leverage the anchoring bias to improve human judgment? If 
human judgment can be substantially influenced by an externally provided anchor, one 
can argue that providing the prediction from an external source to the human judge prior 
to making decisions will also induce the anchoring effect and encourage the human judge 
to align his or her judgment toward the external prediction. If the externally provided 
predictions have a reasonable level of validity for predicting the outcome of interest, 
human judgments, when aligned with external predictions, should also be predictive of 
the outcome. In other words, the accuracy of human judgment should be improved due to 
anchoring when the anchor is highly valid. 
Although the anchoring effect is robust, recent research suggests the magnitude of 
anchoring varies depending on the features of anchors (Dowd, Petrocelli, & Wood, 2014; 
Janiszewski & Uy, 2008) and there is a considerable amount of individual differences in 
the susceptibility to anchoring (Furnham, Boo, & McClelland, 2012; Wilson, Houston, 
Etling, & Brekke, 1996). Therefore, understanding what factors boost the anchoring 
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effect is also crucial for eliciting a favorable anchoring to improve hiring decision-
making. 
The objective of this study is to examine the effectiveness of eliciting a favorable 
anchoring effect to improve hiring decision-making. More specifically, four research 
questions are examined: 1) Does providing human judges with predictions from an 
external source, which serve as anchors upon which one can adjust their judgments, 
affect their decision policy and judgment accuracy? 2) Do features of the anchor 
influence the magnitude of anchoring and the accuracy of human judgment? 3) Do 
individual differences predict susceptibility to anchoring? 4) How do individual 
differences interact with features of the anchor when predicting the magnitude of 
anchoring? 
I next review the literature to integrate the available information in one place and 
help frame the discussion of the current study. First, the anchoring research is introduced 
to explain the underlying mechanisms of anchoring and why providing anchors to human 
judges could potentially improve decision-making. Next, I discuss the extensive research 
comparing clinical and mechanical methods to illustrate how the specific nature of an 
anchor affects the effectiveness of its use to improve human judgment. I then review the 
existing literature on the clinical synthesis, a data combination method in decision-
making which shares the fundamental principles with the intervention proposed in this 
study, to demonstrate the feasibility of using anchoring to improve human judgment. 
Lastly, I discuss how individual differences play important roles in the susceptibility to 
anchoring and the effectiveness of anchoring for improving hiring decision-making. 
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Anchoring Effect 
The anchoring effect was first introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) as 
the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristics, and has since then been replicated in various 
domains, such as general knowledge (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997) and probability 
estimates (Chapman & Johnson, 1999). The effects are not limited to laboratory settings, 
but have been demonstrated with real-world judgments, such as negotiation (Galinsky & 
Mussweiler, 2001), judicial decisions (Englich & Soder, 2009), and forecasting (Critcher 
& Gilovich, 2008). 
In the classic study by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), participants were asked to 
estimate the percentage of African countries in the United Nations. Before actually 
making the judgment, participants were asked to determine whether an arbitrary starting 
value (a value between 0 and 100 determined by spinning a wheel of fortune) was higher 
or lower than the percentage to be estimated. They found that participants’ estimates were 
significantly biased towards the arbitrary starting value. Most anchoring studies have 
followed this two-step procedure where participants first make a comparative judgment, 
comparing the target value with the anchor value, and then make an absolute judgment of 
the target value. However, it has been demonstrated that the anchoring effect could occur 
without the process of explicitly comparing the anchor with the target, but the anchor has 
to be very salient by extensive processing (Wilson et al., 1996). For instance, Wilson et 
al. demonstrated that a quick appraisal of an arbitrary anchor (e.g., counting its number of 
digits) did not cause anchoring, while paying more attention to the number (e.g., 
comparing the anchor with a closely related number) was sufficient to induce anchoring 
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although a direct comparison to the target was absent. However, it was not clear how 
much attention to the anchor would be sufficient. 
The robustness of the anchoring effect in very different domains raises the 
question, “Why are individuals susceptible to the influence of anchors?”. Multiple 
theories have been proposed to account for this robust effect but consensus has not been 
reached regarding what mechanisms contribute to anchoring. To fully understand how the 
anchoring effect can be applied to hiring decision-making, it is important to first review 
those theoretical accounts. I then discuss how the features and presentations of anchors 
may influence the magnitude of anchoring and their implications for eliciting a favorable 
anchoring effect to improve hiring decision-making. 
Theories of Anchoring Effects 
Insufficient Adjustment  
One of the early explanations is that anchoring results from an effortful process of 
adjustment: people adjust their estimate from the anchor value toward the range of 
plausible values, but this adjustment is typically insufficient and therefore the final 
estimate is biased toward the anchor (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). However, this 
mechanism is not applicable to many situations. For instance, the process of adjustment 
cannot explain why anchoring effects occur with both plausible and implausible anchors. 
Individuals adjust when they think the anchor value falls outside of the plausible range of 
values. With plausible anchors, there is no reason to adjust in the first place as the anchor 
is already within the range of possible answers. As a result, the adjustment process is 
only applicable when the anchor is more extreme than the boundary of plausible values 
(Strack & Mussweiler, 1997). Moreover, the finding that anchoring effects can be 
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induced with subliminal anchors indicates that the conscious process of adjustment is not 
necessary for anchoring (Mussweiler & Englich, 2005).  
Selective Availability 
The second theory of anchoring effects, which has received extensive empirical 
support, posits that anchoring occurs because the anchor activates information of the 
target that is consistent with the anchor (Mussweiler & Strack, 1999; Strack & 
Mussweiler, 1997). More specifically, when presented with an anchor, individuals engage 
in a hypothesis testing process where they test the hypothesis that the anchor is the 
correct answer for the target judgment (Chapman & Johnson, 1994). This process of 
confirmatory search increases the availability of similar features between the anchor and 
the target and reduces the availability of features of the target that differ from the anchor 
(Chapman & Johnson, 1999). Subsequently, when individuals make a final judgment, 
they rely heavily on information that is most accessible (Higgins, 1996). Therefore, the 
judgment is biased toward the anchor as the most accessible information is the anchor-
consistent information of the target activated by the anchor.  
According to the selective availability explanation, anchoring should diminish if 
the information activated by the comparative judgment is irrelevant to the target of the 
absolute judgment. For instance, Strack and Mussweiler (1997) found that presenting 
anchors of the width of the Brandenburg Gate had a larger effect on judgments of its 
width but only a small effect on judgments of its height. Moreover, anchoring should not 
occur if the anchor activates information that overlaps with what would have been 
activated by the judgment itself without the anchor. In support of this, Bahník and Strack 
(2016) found that anchoring effect diminished when the comparative judgment concerned 
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a general category and the target of the absolute judgment was a subset of the general 
category that was activated by the anchor. In one of the experiments, participants were 
asked to compare the average annual temperature in New York City to either a low (–4 
°F) or a high (102 °F) anchor. They found that for participants who received the high 
anchor value (102 °F) anchoring occurred for the judgment of the average winter 
(average prediction in the high anchor group was 35.1 °F as compared to 29.5 °F in the 
control group) but not summer temperature (average prediction in the high anchor group 
was 81.5 °F as compared to 82.7 °F in the control group). The high anchor value 
activated information about summer, which overlapped with information that would have 
been activated when making the absolute judgment of the average summer temperature 
without the anchor and therefore did not induce anchoring. On the other hand, the 
information about summer activated by the high anchor did not overlap with information 
activated when making the absolute judgment of the average winter temperature and 
therefore induced anchoring. Similarly, it was found that participants who were presented 
with the low anchor (–4 °F) showed an anchoring effect only when judging the average 
summer temperature (average prediction in the low anchor group was 78.4 °F as 
compared to 82.7 °F in the control group) but not winter temperature (average prediction 
in the low anchor group was 30.4 °F as compared to 29.5 °F in the control group). The 
low anchor value activated information about winter that overlapped with information 
that would have been activated when predicting the average winter temperature without 
the anchor and therefore did not induce anchoring. On the contrary, predicting the 
average summer temperature activated information about summer while the low anchor 
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activated information about winter. Because the anchor and the absolute judgment did not 
activate the same information, anchoring was induced by the low anchor. 
However, the selective availability account has been questioned by recent 
findings that anchoring effects can occur even when the target of the comparative 
judgment is not the same as the target of the subsequent absolute judgment. For instance, 
similar anchoring effects were observed when judging the price of a camera regardless of 
whether the preceding comparative judgment was about a GPS device or a camera 
(Mochon & Frederick, 2013). This finding suggests that selective availability is, at least, 
not the only mechanism underlying anchoring effects.  
Attitude Change 
A more recent perspective suggests that anchors serve multiple roles when 
inducing anchoring effects and anchoring can be a result of thoughtful, high-elaboration 
processes, or non-thoughtful, low-elaboration processes (Wegener, Petty, Blankenship, & 
Detweiler-Bedell, 2010). High-elaboration processes, such as confirmatory search and 
selective accessibility, do not have to occur for anchoring. When individuals lack 
motivation or ability to elaborate, anchoring occurs due to non-thoughtful processes. For 
example, individuals may consider the anchor as a hint to the correct answer without 
consciously evaluating whether the anchor is plausible or relevant when lacking 
motivation or ability (Schwarz, 1994). The notion of thoughtful and non-thoughtful 
processes of anchoring has received some empirical support (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; 
Wegener, Blankenship, Petty, & Detweiler-Bedell, 2009) and this attitude change 
perspective may serve as a promising account of anchoring effects, especially when the 
anchor is extreme and implausible. 
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To conclude, different theories have been proposed to explain the underlying 
process of anchoring although none of them seem to be ubiquitously applicable. Given 
that anchoring effects have been demonstrated with various paradigms in various 
domains, it is understandable that there is no single theory that explains the effect 
unconditionally. More research should investigate under what circumstances each of 
these theories is a better account of anchoring effects. Regardless of theoretical accounts, 
the robustness of anchoring effects holds in a range of fields, but this does not preclude 
the effect from being moderated by various factors. Prior literature suggests how anchors 
are presented affects the magnitude of anchoring. Two features that are most relevant to 
the current study are anchor precision and anchor relevance. 
Anchor Precision 
In a study of general knowledge judgment, Janiszewski and Uy (2008) found that 
anchor precision influenced the magnitude of anchoring such that a precise anchor led to 
less adjustment and thus a stronger anchoring effect than a rounded anchor. For instance, 
when estimating the price of a product (e.g., a plasma TV), participants showed a 
stronger anchoring effect when the anchor was presented as a precise number ($4,998) 
instead of a rounded number ($5,000). They demonstrated that this effect was not due to 
the fact that a precise anchor might result in a narrower range of plausible values than a 
rounded anchor, or a precise anchor might be perceived as more accurate or valid than a 
rounded anchor. In fact, anchor precision impacted the resolution of the underlying 
subjective response scale: a precise anchor results in a finer-grained subjective scale 
where individuals adjust away from the anchor in smaller units, while a rounded anchor 
results in a more coarse-grained scale where adjustment occurs with larger units. 
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However, research suggests that precision only influences the magnitude of anchoring 
effects when the anchor is perceived as informative or relevant to the target judgment 
(Zhang & Schwarz, 2013). 
The finding that precise anchors lead to stronger anchoring was also supported by 
studies of price negotiation, where offer recipients tended to make greater counteroffer 
adjustments, and therefore showed weaker anchoring effects, to round rather than precise 
offers (Loschelder, Stuppi,& Trötschel, 2014; Mason, Lee, Wiley, & Ames, 2013). 
However, a recent study suggests precision could backfire with experts. Loschelder, 
Friese, Schaerer, and Galinsky (2016) showed that in the context of price negotiation, a 
more precise first offer led to stronger anchoring effects for amateurs but an inverted-U-
shaped effects for experts. When the recipients were experts, increased precision first 
boosted anchoring but eventually reduced the anchoring effect. One explanation is that a 
precise offer implies more knowledge and confidence than a round offer (Jerez-
Fernandez, Angulo, & Oppenheimer, 2014; Mason et al., 2013). However, when there is 
too much precision, experts may perceive it as reflecting a lack of competence.  
The implication for the proposed intervention is that when eliciting a favorable 
anchoring effect to improve hiring decision-making, presenting the externally provided 
predictions at a more precise level should induce a stronger anchoring effect and 
therefore a greater improvement in judgment accuracy. Thus, the externally provided 
predictions were presented at different levels of precision in the present study to examine 
how precision affects the magnitude of anchoring and the accuracy of human judgments. 
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Anchor Relevance 
A large body of research has demonstrated that anchoring occurs even when the 
anchor is completely irrelevant and random (Critcher & Gilovich, 2008; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). However, recent research suggests that anchor relevance may 
moderate anchoring effects such that relevant anchors lead to stronger anchoring effects 
than irrelevant anchors. Earlier studies have showed mixed findings of the effect of 
relevance on anchoring, presumably due to small sample sizes and reliance on 
participants’ subjective ratings of relevance (e.g., Chapman & Johnson, 1999; Englich & 
Mussweiler, 2001).  
In a recent study by Glöckner and Englich (2015), participants were instructed to 
make sentencing decisions based on case reports and sentencing guidelines. To 
understand the effect of relevance, participants were randomly assigned to receive no 
anchor, an irrelevant anchor (judgment of an unrelated case from a layperson), or a 
relevant anchor (judgment from an expert). Glöckner and Englich found that anchoring 
effects were stronger when anchors were relevant rather than irrelevant. The finding that 
relevance matters for anchoring is in line with the insufficient adjustment perspective as 
individuals are less likely to adjust away from the anchor value if they consider the 
anchor as relevant. In addition, it is also consistent with the attitude change perspective in 
that if individuals consider the anchor as relevant they should be more likely to consider 
the anchor as a hint of the correct answer for the target judgment (Wegener et al., 2010). 
In addition to legal judgments, the impact of anchor relevance has been found in 
other domains. For instance, when estimating the population of Chicago, IL, participants 
placed greater weight on the externally provided anchor when it was from a highly 
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credible source than a less credible source (Dowd et al., 2014). In another setting where 
participants estimated the maximum price they would pay for a product, Bavoľár (2017) 
found that the anchoring effect was stronger when the anchor was presented as the price 
paid by a hypothetical person (relevant) than when the anchor was from a random 
mathematical task (irrelevant). 
If the relevance of anchors matters, one can argue that providing predictions from 
an external source, which function as relevant anchors, to the human judge as a decision 
aid will also induce the anchoring effect. In fact, the idea of providing external 
predictions to assist human judgment is not new. A version of it was proposed by Sawyer 
(1966) who proposed the clinical synthesis method as an alternative to both the clinical 
method and the mechanical method when integrating data to reach an overall prediction. 
The clinical synthesis refers to the process of providing a statistically combined 
prediction to the human judge and the judge could then integrate the statistical prediction 
with the rest of the data. The statistical prediction is obtained by applying any consistent 
rules (e.g., algorithms, statistical equations, models of human judges, etc.) to integrate the 
data including all relevant predictors and it is essentially an anchor upon which the judge 
can make reasonable adjustments. Here the objective is not that the anchored judgment is 
more accurate than a mechanical composite but it is more accurate than what the judge 
would have produced without the anchor.  
Although the concept was proposed decades ago, only a few studies have 
examined the predictive power of the clinical synthesis above and beyond purely clinical 
and mechanical methods with mixed results (e.g., Ægisdóttir et al., 2006; Leli & Filskov, 
1984; Melton, 1952). One explanation for the scarcity of research is decision makers’ 
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preference for using holistic approaches (i.e., human intuition) instead of analytical 
approaches (i.e., algorithms or statistical models) in employment decisions (Highhouse, 
2008; Nolan, 2012). As a result, decision makers are less likely to adopt a decision aid if 
it stems from a purely statistical source (e.g., statistically combined predictions) instead 
of a more intuition-based source (e.g., expert predictions). The present study examines 
how the source of anchors affects the extent to which decision makers accept externally 
provided anchors (i.e., the magnitude of anchoring). Although the external predictions 
were obtained based on a statistical model, information about the external source was 
manipulated to vary along a holistic-analytical continuum (i.e., a statistical model, expert 
judgment, or a combination of a statistical method and expert judgment).  
Given practitioners’ preference for intuition-based rather than analytical 
approaches, I propose that judges will perceive expert judgment as the most credible and 
acceptable source and therefore show the greatest anchoring effect when being informed 
that the external predictions are based on expert judgment. Whether the source of anchors 
affects the degree of anchoring also provides a test of the three different theories of 
anchoring. According to the insufficient adjustment account, the source of anchors 
matters as the more credible individuals perceive a source is the less likely they would 
adjust from the anchor and therefore show stronger anchoring. Similarly, according to the 
attitude change account, the source of anchors matters because the more credible 
individuals perceive a source is, the more likely they would believe the anchor is a hint to 
the correct answer and therefore show stronger anchoring. On the other hand, the 
selective availability account would predict that the source of anchors does not 
necessarily affect the degree of anchoring. When one compares the target with the anchor 
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value, the accessibility of anchor-consistent information about the target is increased 
regardless of whether the anchor is informative (Englich & Mussweiler, 2001).   
To fully understand how the tension between holistic and analytical approaches 
affects employment decisions and the implications for eliciting a favorable anchoring 
effect to improve hiring decisions, I next review the extensive research on the clinical and 
mechanical prediction debate. Prior literature on the clinical synthesis will also be 
discussed to demonstrate the feasibility of using anchoring to improve human judgment. 
Clinical versus Mechanical Prediction 
The debate over clinical versus mechanical prediction was first broadly 
introduced in Paul Meehl’s (1954) seminal work, Clinical vs. Statistical Prediction: A 
Theoretical Analysis and a Review of the Evidence. The clinical prediction (i.e., expert 
judgment, holistic method, intuition-based approach, etc.) refers to any processes relying 
on human judgment and intuition to integrate data in order to make an overall prediction. 
In contrast, the mechanical prediction (i.e., statistical, actuarial, or algorithmic prediction, 
etc.) refers to any processes using algorithms or statistical formulas to integrate data. 
Meehl (1954) reviewed 20 studies in the literature and showed that the mechanical 
method was equal to or superior to the clinical method in every case. Since then, the 
robust superiority of mechanical methods over clinical methods has been demonstrated 
across a range of fields, such as physical and mental health diagnoses (Grove & Meehl, 
1996; Grove et al., 2000), hiring and admission decisions (Highhouse & Kostek, 2013; 
Kuncel, Klieger, Connelly, & Ones, 2013).  
Focusing on predicting human health and behavior, Grove et al. (2000) 
demonstrated that mechanical predictions were consistently as accurate as or more 
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accurate than clinical predictions across judgment tasks, types of judges, and types of 
data being combined. However, most studies included in this meta-analysis were health-
related and only a few studies made predictions of work outcomes. Borman (1982) found 
that when predicting training performance, statistical composites of assessment ratings 
were slightly more valid than the consensus judgment by multiple assessors. Similarly, a 
primary study by Ganzach, Kluger, and Klayman (2000) illustrated that the mechanical 
combination of information collected in a structured interview outperformed clinical 
judgment. A recent meta-analysis examined this issue in the context of job selections and 
academic admissions (Kuncel et al., 2013). In the context of selection and admissions, 
mechanical data combination methods refer to reaching a selection decision by statistical 
models, such as multiple regression, unit-weighting, differential weighting, and 
bootstrapped weighting of the predictors (e.g., scores collected via tests, interviews, 
resumes etc.). Clinical combinations refer to reaching a selection decision by one or 
multiple human assessors who have access to the data of the predictors. Consistent with 
previous research, Kuncel et al. found that mechanical combinations yielded larger 
validities than clinical combinations for most criteria and equal validities for a few 
criteria. There is clear evidence that mechanical approaches in general have stronger 
correlations with standard validation criteria in the context of hiring decision-making.  
 One major explanation for the superiority of mechanical methods is human 
cognitive limitations. Compared with statistical models, human judges are much more 
inconsistent in applying weighting schemas across judgments (Grove & Meehl, 1996). 
They also tend to overemphasize salient cues that are not necessarily predictive of the 
outcome (Kuncel et al., 2013) and believe in illusory relationships (Chapman & 
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Chapman, 1969). Both result in less optimal weights than statistically modeled weights. 
As discussed earlier, because of limited cognitive capacities, decision makers often 
engage in fast heuristics instead of comprehensive analysis when making decisions. 
Although heuristics often produce “good enough” decisions, they lead to systematic 
biases especially in complex scenarios. For instance, the representativeness heuristic 
refers to the tendency of estimating the probability of one event based on whether the 
event is representative of another event. An example provided by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974) is that “consider an individual, Mr. X, who has been described as ‘meticulous, 
introverted, meek, solemn’, and the following set of occupational roles: farmer, salesman, 
pilot, librarian, physician. How do people evaluate the likelihood that Mr. X is engaged in 
each of these occupations, and how do they order the occupations in terms of 
likelihood?” (p. 3). According to the representativeness heuristic, people will rank order 
the likelihood of each occupation by the extent to which Mr. X is representative of the 
stereotypes associated with each occupation. Because the personality descriptions of Mr. 
X are representative of the stereotype of librarians, people are more likely to predict Mr. 
X as a librarian due to representativeness bias.  However, representativeness or similarity 
should not be confounded with probability. When estimating the probability that Mr. X is 
a librarian versus a farmer, the fact that the base rate of farmers is higher than the base 
rate of librarians should be considered even though Mr. X is more similar to the 
stereotypes of librarians than farmers. Ignoring the base rate of outcomes would lead to 
biased estimates. In the context of hiring decisions, if decision makers possess 
stereotypes of what an ideal candidate should be like, decision makers may use the 
representativeness heuristic to determine the hireability of a candidate based on how 
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similar (s)he is to these stereotypes. If the stereotypes are not valid predictors of future 
success, decisions based on the representativeness heuristic will be biased. 
Besides cognitive limitations, overconfidence in human judgments also 
contributes to the underperformance of clinical methods. Most people object to 
mechanical methods due to implicit belief that people gain expertise in making judgments 
and this expertise can improve subsequent predictions (Highhouse, 2008). Indeed, experts 
often have valuable insights and they can take into account idiosyncrasies of a given 
situation. For instance, when making judgments experts tend to rely on broken-leg cues – 
cues that are rare but highly diagnostic (Meehl, 1954). However, these unique cases 
rarely occur, are not completely reliable, and their importance is often overestimated. 
Empirical data has shown that overreliance on expertise may undermine the accuracy and 
quality of judgments (Camerer & Johnson, 1991; Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989). 
Efforts to Improve Decision Accuracy 
Although extensive research has shown that statistical data combination methods 
are more accurate than human intuition, most practitioners are reluctant to rely on 
statistical models when making decisions. Both individual level and organizational level 
factors contribute to the resistance. For instance, decision makers resist statistical 
methods due to belief in human intuition (Highhouse, 2008) and lack of knowledge and 
education of statistical models (Vrieze & Grove, 2009). Moreover, Nolan and Highouse 
(2014) suggested that practitioners’ intention to use a particular hiring practice is affected 
by their beliefs of whether the practice fulfills their need for autonomy. When compared 
with intuition-based methods, statistical data combination methods reduce the amount of 
autonomy that decision makers have in the decision-making process, and the decrease in 
		 19 
autonomy reduces their intention to use statistical methods. At a broad level, politics and 
culture in organizations also discourage the use of purely statistical methods and 
encourage the use of human intuition (Johns, 1993; Muchinsky, 2004; Terpstra & Rozell, 
1997).  
Given the common resistance to using mechanical methods in hiring decisions 
(Highouse, 2008; Nolan & Highhouse, 2014), it is important to understand how to 
improve the accuracy of human judgment. One intervention that has received the most 
attention is feedback. To understand the effect of feedback, a fair amount of studies used 
the multiple-cue probability learning (MCPL) paradigm, where participants were asked to 
predict an outcome using a number of cues and learned to improve their accuracy with 
feedback over multiple trials (e.g., Hammond, Summers, & Deane, 1973). Extensive 
evidence has shown that task information feedback (information about the actual 
relationships between cues as well as between cues and the criterion) increases accuracy,  
but outcome feedback (providing the actual criterion value after human judges attempted 
to predict that value) is generally not effective and may even impair performance (Balzer, 
Sulsky, Hammer, & Sumner, 1992; Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008).  
In addition to feedback, providing judges with certain training may be helpful 
(Harding, 2004). For instance, Garb (1989) suggests that training on biases that could 
influence judgment improves accuracy. In addition, one can provide judges with 
information on cue weighting strategies. In an unpublished study on hiring decision-
making, it was found that training on the validities of different cues impacted human 
judgments such that participants placed greater weight on cues with stronger validities as 
taught in the training (Shu, Kuncel, & Yu, 2017). Moreover, they showed that providing 
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participants with the unit-weighted composites of cues and informing them that unit-
weighted composites generally approximate the overall prediction also led participants to 
apply more uniform weights on different cues. This latter finding indicates that providing 
judges with statistically combined predictions (i.e., the clinical synthesis) can influence 
their weighting policy to some extent.  
Clinical Synthesis 
The term of clinical synthesis was first proposed by Sawyer (1966) as an 
extension to the “sophisticated clinical” approach (Holt, 1958), which synthesizes clinical 
and statistical methods. The fundamental idea of the clinical synthesis is to provide the 
human judge with the statistical prediction along with the rest of the data and let the 
human judge make the final judgment. Sawyer (1966) found that, based on a review of 
three studies, the clinical synthesis was superior to the clinical method but the mechanical 
judgment was better than either one. A more recent meta-analysis of clinical judgment 
studies over 56 years showed that clinical methods were less accurate than statistical 
methods regardless of whether clinicians had access to the statistical formulas (Ægisdóttir 
et al., 2006). It should be noted that clinicians were provided with statistical formulas in 
only 5 out of the 48 studies analyzed and the meta-analysis did not directly compare the 
accuracy of clinical judgments with or without access to the statistical formula. Given the 
scarcity of prior research, I next briefly review the specific results from the six studies 
(reviewed by Sawyer, 1966 or Ægisdóttir et al., 2006) that directly compared the 
accuracy of the clinical synthesis with the clinical or mechanical prediction. 
Table 1 summarizes the essential elements of each of those six studies: criterion, 
sample (judges), statistical information given to judges, accuracy statistic, and accuracy 
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of clinical method, mechanical method, and clinical synthesis. The first three studies 
concerned judgments in clinical settings. Leli and Filskov (1981) provided six clinical 
psychologists and six graduate students in a clinical psychology program with tests, 
protocols and demographic data of brain-impaired and non-impaired individuals and 
asked them to identify and describe the nature of brain impairment. They found that when 
given the linear discriminant functions along with classifications based on each function, 
judges were significantly better at identifying and determining the extent of brain 
impairment than when the statistical information was not available. The overall hit rates 
improved from 41% in the clinical judgment condition to 50% in the clinical synthesis 
condition. However, statistical functions were still superior to the clinical synthesis 
(62%).  
Leli and Filskov (1984) conducted a similar study where five clinical 
psychologists and five pre-doctoral interns in clinical psychology were asked to identify 
intellectual deterioration associated with brain damage based on test protocols and 
demographic data of brain-impaired and non-impaired individuals. Participants first made 
judgments without any statistical information and then rated the same protocols given a 
discriminant function developed by Leli and Filskov (1979) along with classifications 
based on the function. It was found that access to the statistical information only 
improved the classification accuracy of clinicians (from 58.3% to 75%) but not interns. 
Discriminant function was associated with the highest classification accuracy (83.3%). 
This indicated that compared with interns, experienced clinicians were more open to and 
more effective at integrating the statistical information into their final judgment. It is 
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possible that clinicians possessed more knowledge and experience of how to interpret and 
use the discriminant function than the interns.  
In the study by Perez (1976), six graduate students in clinical psychology made 
distinctions between test protocols belonging to men convicted of first and second degree 
murder and men convicted of crimes against property. The finding was that providing 
clinical judges with formulas from a multivariate analysis improved the overall 
categorization rate from 51% to 58%, however, it did not reach the accuracy of the 
multivariate function (83%).  
Contrary to the finding that the clinical synthesis improved judgment accuracy, 
the next three studies showed that the clinical synthesis was no better than the clinical or 
mechanical method. Two studies examined predictions of academic performance. Melton 
(1952) tested whether college counselors who knew the actuarial predictions before 
making their clinical predictions could make better predictions of first year honor point 
ratio (i.e., grade point average) for freshman students they interviewed than those who 
did not know the actuarial predictions. Six counselors were given an actuarial table 
(where one can identify the predicted criterion value by finding the intersection of 
predictor values along the column and the row) and instructed to estimate the actuarial 
predictions before making their own predictions. A control group of six counselors were 
instructed to make predictions without any access to the actuarial table. Melton found that 
counselors’ judgments were not substantially improved by knowing the actuarial 
predictions ahead, nor were they comparable with the accuracy of the actuarial method. It 
is important to note that in this study the actual calculated value was not provided to the 
judge. Instead they were given a look up tool. Similarly, Watley and Vance (1964) found 
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that providing 111 counselors with three types of statistical data (e.g., expectancy table, 
correlation matrix, and multiple regression equation) did not increase the accuracy of 
counselors when predicting college achievement. The authors speculated that the 
counselors might be provided with too much information that they might not even know 
how to use the statistical data. Like the previous study, judges were not given a 
mechanical combination but tools to obtain one based on their own effort. The last of the 
three studies dealt with performance forecasting. In the domain of predicting college 
football games, Harris (1963) found that when eight football coaches, as well as the judge 
who developed a mathematical formula to predict outcomes of football games, were 
asked to improve on the predictions of the mathematical formula using any 
supplementary information available; they could not exceed the accuracy of the 
mathematical formula, which was based solely on a single index of past performance. 
Note that in this study there was not a comparison between unaided and aided judges. 
Instead the study examined whether judges could improve on a formula in this setting. 
In addition to the six studies discussed above, a few more studies were located in 
which human judges were provided with statistical information prior to making 
judgments. When making the diagnosis of neurosis or psychosis based on patients’ 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) profiles, the accuracy of human 
judges (10 non-psychologists who were unfamiliar with the MMPI and 10 psychology 
graduate students who had some familiarity with the MMPI) was stably improved when 
they were provided with the numerical predictions from a statistical formula (Goldberg, 
1968). The average accuracy of judges was a bit below the accuracy of the formula. 
However, simply providing judges with the formula showed a rapid increase in accuracy 
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but the improvement in accuracy diminished over the eight-week training period. It 
should be noted that in the study judges were informed about the accuracy of the formula 
and encouraged to improve on the formula prediction. This differs from most studies 
where statistical predictions were merely presented as a reference. 
One may argue that it is of no practical importance to compare human judgment 
with an optimal weighting method (e.g., linear regressions) as optimal models are rarely 
available in non-laboratory settings. Yet, evidence suggests that providing judges with 
predictions of bootstrapping models (i.e., models based on human judgment) also helps. 
Peterson and Pitz (1986) found that providing 20 MBA students with the predictions 
from a bootstrapping model derived from their previous predictions increased their 
subsequent predictions of the number of games a National League baseball team won 
during a year (absolute error dropped from 195.05 to 174.9 after providing the 
bootstrapping predictions), although they were not as accurate as the model itself 
(absolute error = 162.65). They also showed that this increase in accuracy was partially 
due to increased consistency of participants in using the cues available.  
Additional evidence came from research on judgmental forecasts of time series 
data in areas such as marketing and sales. These areas are characterized by regular 
established patterns that are occasionally affected by exogenous factors. One potential 
advantage of human judgment is that judges can take into account effects of the 
exogenous factors, where reliable statistical estimations are difficult to reach given the 
infrequency of such factors (Goodwin & Fildes, 1999). However, there are mixed 
findings of whether judgmental adjustments of statistical predictions can consistently 
outperform the statistical models (Carbone, Anderson, Corriveau, & Corson, 1983; Lim 
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& O’Connor, 1995). For example, in the context of sales forecasting, judgmentally 
revising sales forecasts produced by a quantitative model occasionally but not 
consistently yielded forecasts that were superior to the statistical forecasts (Mathews & 
Diamantopoulos, 1989).  
To summarize findings of prior research, several studies showed that the clinical 
synthesis, which is akin to providing an anchor, led to increased accuracy when 
compared with a purely clinical prediction (without knowledge of the statistical 
predictions), but the magnitude of improvements was typically small. Even when the 
clinical synthesis improved accuracy, it still could not reach the accuracy of mechanical 
methods. However, one study showed that when providing clinicians with relevant 
information along with a mechanical index based on a subset of the information, they 
predicted equally well as the mechanical index (Goldstein, Deysach, & Kleinknecht; 
1973). Since the mechanical index is only based on a subset of information, it is arguable 
that the finding might be primarily due to clinicians having more data than the 
mechanical counterpart.  
However, caution should be taken in drawing conclusions given the following 
issues of previous studies. First, all the studies were based on small convenience samples 
(the sample size was below 10 for the majority), which not only limits the power to detect 
true differences between methods but also makes it hard to generalize findings to other 
settings. Second, the majority of the studies involved judgments in the domain of mental 
health or brain impairment. Only two studies most relevant to the current study examined 
predictions of academic performance. It is unknown whether the nature of hiring 
decision-making would prevent generalizing findings in these domains to hiring decision-
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making. Lastly, in prior studies, human judges were typically provided with the statistical 
functions although there were a few studies in which judges were given the precise 
statistical predictions. One could argue that directly providing a precise statistical 
prediction may be more compelling and easier to process than providing a statistical 
formula, as judges may refuse to or not know how to use the formula to obtain a 
statistical prediction. More research is needed before firm conclusions can be made about 
the effectiveness of the clinical synthesis. 
As discussed earlier, practitioners’ resistance towards analytical methods in 
employment decisions might have weakened the effectiveness of the clinical synthesis. 
To improve upon the clinical synthesis, this study examines whether the anchoring effect 
could be leveraged to improve hiring decision-making. Human judges were provided 
with statistically combined predictions prior to making their own predictions, but unlike 
the clinical synthesis, where judges are aware of the statistical nature of the predictions, 
information about the source of the predictions was manipulated to vary along a holistic-
analytical continuum (i.e., a statistical model, expert judgment, or a combination of a 
statistical method and expert judgment). If the reliance on intuition-based instead of 
analytical approaches is so pervasive, judges will be more likely to accept predictions 
from a more intuition-based source, and therefore show stronger anchoring. This will in 
turn affect their decision policy and accuracy. 
Individual Differences 
Not only can features and presentations of anchors influence the magnitude of 
anchoring effects, but also individuals with certain characteristics may be more prone to 
anchoring. Next, I review existing research on the role of individual differences in 
		 27 
susceptibility to anchoring. The discussion is focused on a group of individual differences 
that are examined in this study. 
Expertise/Experience 
Theoretically, expert judges are more knowledgeable and less uncertain about 
making judgments in a specific domain, and thus should be less susceptible to anchoring. 
However, empirical findings have been mixed. On one hand, strong anchoring effects 
among expert judges have been demonstrated in multiple domains, such as car-selling 
(Mussweiler et al., 2000), real-estate price estimation (Northcraft & Neale, 1987), and 
legal judgments (Englich & Mussweiler, 2001).  
However, anchoring may not always occur. Wilson et al. (1996) found anchoring 
did not occur with people who identified themselves as knowledgeable about the target 
judgment (a general knowledge question about the number of countries in the United 
Nations). In their study, individuals who identified themselves as knowledgeable of the 
question might know the correct answer (i.e., they knew exactly how many countries 
there are in the United Nations). Instead, expert judges in the other studies might only 
have more general experience and knowledge about the domain but not the specific 
knowledge of the true value. For instance, experts in the car business may be 
knowledgeable of how certain characteristics of the car affect the selling price but they do 
not necessarily know the exact price of a given car to be evaluated. As a result, expertise 
only matters if one knows the true value of the target judgment.  
Despite the predominant view that susceptibility to anchoring is not affected by 
expertise, a recent study suggests that knowledge level matters for anchoring (Smith, 
Windschitl, & Bruchmann, 2013). For example, in the first experiment, Smith et al. found 
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that greater knowledge of football led to smaller anchoring effects on football-related 
judgments. Importantly, knowledge was measured with an objective knowledge quiz, and 
therefore reflected true knowledge rather than confidence in their estimates. More 
interestingly, in a subsequent experiment, researchers manipulated the knowledge level of 
participants by providing them with either irrelevant or relevant information prior to 
making judgments. They found that anchoring was reduced when participants were given 
and encouraged to process information that would increase their knowledge level for the 
target judgment. This was in contrast with Englich (2008) where a similar manipulation 
failed to reduce anchoring effects by presenting participants with relevant information 
before making an anchored judgment. Smith et al. argued that simply providing relevant 
information was not sufficient to mitigate anchoring, but rather participants should be 
encouraged to actively process the information.  
To reconcile the inconsistencies, one possibility is that expertise is more likely to 
reduce anchoring effects for judgments involving factual knowledge where objectively 
correct answers exist (e.g., football-related questions in Smith et al., 2013), compared to 
judgments with more subjectivity (e.g., sentencing decisions in Englich & Mussweiler, 
2001). Moreover, expertise matters more to the extent that more specific knowledge is 
accessible. For instance, Smith et al. (2013) provided participants with relevant 
information to increase their knowledge level immediately before making judgments. In 
this situation, specific knowledge (prices of five different cars) was relatively accessible 
and influenced the subsequent judgment (average price of a new midsized sedan), and 
therefore reduced the effect of a random anchor. However, with other studies described 
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earlier, one could argue that experts might only possess general knowledge of the 
domain, which could not be easily applied to the specific judgment.  
To conclude, the majority of research suggests that expertise does not 
substantially reduce anchoring effects. A few studies showed that the impact of expertise 
was more profound when the target judgment concerned general knowledge with 
objectively correct answers (Smith et al., 2013; Wilson et al., 1996). Although experts are 
not immune to anchoring, one study suggests expertise may moderate the effect of mood 
on anchoring. Englich and Soder (2009) showed that emotions only affected the 
magnitude of anchoring for non-experts: experts adjusted their judgment toward the 
given anchor regardless of their mood, while non-experts were only susceptible to the 
anchoring effect when they were in a sad rather than a happy mood. Some researchers 
have speculated that when experts are presented with an anchor, they engage in more 
thorough information processing, and therefore more anchor-consistent information is 
activated (Furnham & Boo, 2011). Although experts have more overall knowledge (both 
anchor-consistent and anchor-inconsistent) about the target, increased accessibility of 
anchor-consistent information overrides anchor-inconsistent information, which leads to 
biased judgments (Smith et al., 2013). To make matters worse, experts are typically more 
confident and certain about what they know and may consider themselves as less 
susceptible to anchoring, which could cause insufficient adjustment from the anchor 
value (Englich & Mussweiler, 2001). 
Cognitive Ability 
Mixed results were found regarding the relationship between cognitive ability and 
anchoring susceptibility. Stanovich and West (2008) showed that cognitive ability was 
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unrelated to some cognitive biases, including anchoring effects. In partial support of this, 
Oechssler, Roider, and Schmitz (2009) reported that cognitive ability predicted 
conjunction fallacy and conservatism in updating probability, but not anchoring. 
Although the effect on anchoring was not statistically significant, those with higher 
cognitive ability scores showed higher susceptibility to anchoring. They speculated that 
individuals with higher cognitive ability scores might be more likely to understand the 
intention of the question, and therefore provided an estimate closer to the anchor.  
Other studies have demonstrated the opposite effect of cognitive ability on 
anchoring. Bergman, Ellingsen, Johannesson, and Svensson (2010) found that anchoring 
effects were reduced in a group of participants with higher cognitive ability, but the 
anchoring effects were still sizable. In their study, participants were asked to write down 
the last two digits of their social security number (anchor), and then estimated the 
maximum price they were willing to pay for a product. Bergman et al. used two measures 
of cognitive ability: the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005), and a more 
standard general intelligence test (Sjöberg, Sjöberg, & Forssén, 2006). To reconcile 
inconsistencies with prior findings, Bergman et al. discussed two methodological issues 
of the two studies mentioned above. First, Stanovich and West (2008) used self-reported 
SAT scores as the measure of cognitive ability, which has been shown to have non-
negligible measurement errors (Kuncel, Crede, & Thomas, 2005). Second, Oechssler et 
al. (2009) used the CRT to measure cognitive ability. The CRT is designed to distinguish 
between more impulsive and more reflective decision makers, and thus measures limited 
aspects of cognitive abilities. In line with this, Bergman et al. found that differences in 
anchoring susceptibility between low and high cognitive ability groups were only 
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observed when using the general intelligence test but not the CRT. However, a recent 
study failed to find any impact of cognitive ability on anchoring effects even though 
cognitive ability was measured with a general intelligence test and a verbal reasoning test 
(Furnham et al., 2012). 
Although most research has shown that cognitive ability does not significantly 
reduce anchoring effects, some suggests that it may help individuals become less 
susceptible to anchoring over time. In a study where participants estimated how likely 
they were to win in a card-game over 140 trials, it was found that cognitive ability was 
unrelated to anchoring at the first quarter of trials. However, individuals with higher 
cognitive ability were more likely to become less susceptible to anchoring as the task 
progressed (Welsh, Delfabbro, Burns, & Begg, 2014). The authors inferred that instead of 
directly reducing anchoring effects, cognitive ability affects the rate at which individuals 
gain expertise and knowledge of the task, and the increase in expertise over trials 
explains the differences in anchor susceptibility between low and high cognitive ability 
groups over time. 
Decision Styles 
Decision styles measure the extent to which individuals use a certain strategy or 
style when making decisions, and therefore may be related to whether individuals are 
likely to be influenced by anchors during decision-making. For instance, a rational style 
is characterized by deliberate thoughts and logical evaluations of alternatives when 
making decisions (Scott & Bruce, 1995). Because of an emphasis on logic and rationality, 
individuals high on the rational style may be more likely to thoroughly evaluate the entire 
decision scenario instead of focusing on anchors, and may be less susceptible to 
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anchoring. Only two studies directly examined the association between decision styles 
and anchoring effects. Similar to their findings of cognitive ability, Welsh et al. (2014) 
showed that decision styles did not predict susceptibility to anchoring at the beginning of 
the task, but was positively related to the extent to which individuals became less 
susceptible to anchoring over time. More specifically, participants high on preference for 
rationality and aptitude for rationality were more likely to become less susceptible to 
anchoring over trials. In other words, individuals who prefer to be rational or have the 
ability to be rational while making decisions tend to show reduced susceptibility to 
anchoring over time.  
On the other hand, Cheek and Norem (2017) found that individuals with a more 
holistic thinking style (i.e., more attention to context and the field) were less susceptible 
to anchoring effects than those with a more analytic thinking style (i.e., more attention to 
specific elements). They speculate that individuals with an analytic thinking style might 
focus more on individual elements of the task, and therefore might process anchors in 
more depth than those with a holistic style, and more thorough processing of anchors 
increases anchoring effects (Bodenhausen, Gabriel, & Lineberger, 2000). 
Findings of the two studies seem to be contradictory given that the rational style is 
typically considered as interchangeable with the analytic style (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-
Raj, & Heier, 1996). The rational style is characterized by deliberate thoughts and logical 
evaluations of alternatives (Scott & Bruce, 1995). Similarly, the analytic style is 
characterized by attention to individual elements and integrating elements with detailed 
calculations and decision rules (Sjöberg, 2003). Therefore, further research is needed to 
understand the role of rationality in susceptibility to anchoring. 
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Resistance to Scientific Personnel Selection  
Although not directly related to anchoring effects, the common resistance to using 
statistical methods in employment decisions raises the question, “Are individuals more 
resistant to statistical methods less susceptible to anchors, especially when anchors are 
from statistical models?”. Nolan, Carter, and Dalal (2016) found that decision makers 
were perceived as less responsible for the outcomes of employment decisions when the 
statistical rather than holistic data combination method was used. Furthermore, this 
belief, that stakeholders would perceive decision makers as having less control and 
responsibility over the hiring process, affected decision makers’ intention to use more 
standardized employee selection methods (e.g., statistical data combination method) due 
to perceived threat of technological unemployment. This finding suggests that the 
effectiveness of the clinical synthesis may depend on the extent to which decision makers 
are resistant to scientific personnel selection. Those who are more resistant are less likely 
to be influenced even when statistical predictions are presented to them. 
The present study examines how those individual difference variables (i.e., prior 
experience with hiring decision-making, cognitive ability, decision styles, and resistance 
to scientific personnel selection) are associated with anchoring susceptibility. Previous 
literature has shown mixed findings of whether anchoring effects are reduced for experts. 
It is plausible that individuals with more prior experience in employee selection are more 
likely to make judgments based on their own strategies formed in previous hiring 
decisions instead of relying on the anchors provided.  
Although prior research suggests that cognitive ability does not substantially 
reduce anchoring, it has been argued that specific abilities, instead of general cognitive 
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ability, may be more predictive of anchoring susceptibility. This study examines whether 
the specific ability that is more relevant to the judgment (i.e., numerical reasoning) and 
the specific ability that is less relevant to the judgment (i.e., verbal reasoning) are 
differentially related to anchoring susceptibility. If a more relevant specific ability is 
more predictive of anchoring susceptibility, it may explain why past studies using general 
measures of cognitive ability failed to find any effects of cognitive ability on anchoring. 
Little research has been focused on the relationships between decision styles and 
anchoring susceptibility. A few studies have shown that certain decision styles, such as 
the rational style, are related to decision-making outcomes such as general decision-
making competence (Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2007) and decision quality 
(Hough & Ogilvie, 2005). This study examines how decision styles are associated with 
anchoring susceptibility using the General Decision-Making Style (GDMS, Scott & 
Bruce, 1985) that evaluates five styles: rational (tendency to use rationality when making 
decisions), avoidant (tendency to avoid or delay decision-making), dependent (tendency 
to rely on directions from others when making decisions), intuitive (tendency to use 
feelings and emotions when making decisions), and spontaneous (tendency to get through 
the decision-making process as soon as possible). 
The last individual difference variable, resistance to scientific personnel selection, 
is not directly related to anchoring susceptibility, but may play an important role in the 
effectiveness of eliciting a favorable anchoring effect. Individuals who are more resistant 
to scientific personnel selection are less likely to use more standardized employee 
selection methods (e.g., statistical data combination method), and therefore the clinical 
synthesis may be less effective among those individuals. However, if the resistance is 
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only towards statistical methods, then participants who are more resistant will be more 
likely to accept the anchors, and therefore show stronger anchoring when being informed 
that the anchor source is expert judgment instead of a statistical model.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The primary purpose of this study is to examine the effectiveness of eliciting a 
favorable anchoring effect to improve the accuracy of human judgment. More 
specifically, four research questions are examined. The first question concerns whether 
providing human judges with predictions from an external source, which serve as anchors 
upon which one can adjust their judgments, influences the decision policy and the 
accuracy of human judgment in the context of hiring decision-making. Based on prior 
research, I hypothesize that participants receiving anchors prior to making judgments will 
show higher accuracy than those not receiving anchors (Hypothesis 1). 
The second question focuses on whether features of the anchor and its 
presentation affect the magnitude of anchoring and the accuracy of human judgment. The 
first feature examined is anchor source. In the current study, participants were randomly 
assigned to receive the information that the external prediction (i.e., the anchor) is from 
1) a statistical model (i.e., the mechanical condition), 2) expert judgment (i.e., the clinical 
condition), or 3) a combination of a statistical method and expert judgment (i.e., the 
hybrid condition). The three sources of anchors fall along a holistic-analytical continuum 
with the hybrid in between. Given the common objection to using purely analytical 
methods in hiring decisions, I hypothesize that participants in the clinical condition will 
show the strongest anchoring effect (i.e., their judgments will be more aligned with the 
provided anchors), followed by those in the hybrid condition, and those in the mechanical 
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condition will show the least anchoring (Hypothesis 2a). Because the actual anchor 
values were determined with a unit-weighting approach and unit-weighted composites of 
predictors typically yield larger validities than subjective judgments, I hypothesize that 
stronger anchoring will result in higher judgment accuracy in the clinical condition, 
followed by the hybrid and the mechanical conditions (Hypothesis 2b). 
The second feature of anchors examined is anchor precision. Prior research has 
shown that anchor precision influences the magnitude of anchoring such that, compared 
with a rounded anchor, a precise anchor results in less adjustment, and thus a stronger 
anchoring effect (Janiszewski & Uy, 2008). In this study, participants receiving anchors 
were randomly assigned to receive either the high-precision anchor, a judgment value 
with one decimal point (e.g., 92.2), or the low-precision anchor, a judgment value to the 
nearest 10th with no decimal point (e.g., 90). I hypothesize that high-precision anchors 
will induce stronger anchoring effects (Hypothesis 2c) and thus higher judgment accuracy 
(Hypothesis 2d) than low-precision anchors. 
The third question focuses on how individual differences predict susceptibility to 
anchoring. More specifically, the following individual difference measures are examined: 
1) prior experience with employee selection, 2) cognitive ability, 3) decision styles (i.e., 
rational, avoidant, dependent, intuitive, spontaneous styles), and 4) resistance to scientific 
personnel selection methods. Based on prior literature, I hypothesize that 1) individuals 
with more prior experience in employee selection will show weaker anchoring as they are 
more likely to rely on their own knowledge and strategies formed in past decisions 
(Hypothesis 3a); 2) individuals higher on the rational style will show weaker anchoring 
as they tend to engage in logical evaluations and deliberate thoughts when making 
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decisions (Hypothesis 3b); 3) individuals higher on the dependent style will show 
stronger anchoring given their tendency to search for advice and direction from others 
(Hypothesis 3c); and 4) individuals higher on the avoidant, intuitive, or spontaneous style 
will show stronger anchoring, as they are all characterized by a preference for relying on 
hunches and feelings to get through the decision-making process quickly (Hypothesis 3d). 
No direct hypotheses are formed regarding how cognitive ability and resistance to 
standardized employee selection methods relate to susceptibility to anchoring due to 
mixed or lack of results from prior literature. 
The fourth question concerns whether individual differences interact with features 
of the anchor when predicting the magnitude of anchoring. I hypothesize that 1) the 
negative association between prior experience and anchoring will be reduced in the 
clinical condition when compared with the mechanical condition, because experienced 
decision makers are more likely to show a preference for intuitive over analytical 
approaches, and thus are more likely to accept anchors from a more intuitive source 
(Hypothesis 4a); 2) the negative association between the rational style and anchoring will 
be reduced in the mechanical condition when compared with the clinical condition, 
because individuals high on the rational style are characterized by the tendency to use 
logical evaluations rather than intuitions to make decisions, and thus are more likely to 
accept anchors from a more analytical source (Hypothesis 4b); 3) the positive association 
between anchoring and avoidant, intuitive, or spontaneous style will be increased in the 
clinical condition when compared with the mechanical condition, given that they prefer 
using intuitions to quickly get through the decision-making process, and thus are more 
likely to accept anchors from a more intuitive source (Hypothesis 4c); and 4) the 
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association between resistance to standardized employee selection methods and 
anchoring will be negative in the mechanical condition, but positive in the clinical 
condition given their preference for intuitive over analytical approaches (Hypothesis 4d). 
Method 
Sample 
1400 participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk. The data that 
were provided to participants for decision-making were real employment data obtained 
from Sackett, Berry, Wiemann, and Laczo (2006). The data set contains self-reported Big 
Five personality scores (i.e., Extraversion, Agreeableness, Openness, Emotional Stability, 
and Conscientiousness). These scores are linked in the dataset to a measure of each 
worker’s counterproductive work behaviors (CWB) at an organization. The measure of 
CWB was not provided to participants but used as the criterion to estimate the accuracy 
of predictions based on the five personality scores.  
Study Design 
This study was a 3 (Anchor Source) X 2 (Anchor Precision) between-subjects 
design with an additional control condition that received no anchors and was asked to use 
the personality scores to make a prediction. Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of the following conditions: 1) control condition (no anchors were provided); 2) 
mechanical, high-precision anchors; 3) mechanical, low-precision anchors; 4) hybrid, 
high-precision anchors; 5) hybrid, low-precision anchors; 6) clinical, high-precision 
anchors; 7) clinical, low-precision anchors. All participants were given information about 
the relative predictive power of each of the Big Five scales. Table 2 summarizes the main 
features and examples of each condition. 
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Measures 
Prior Experience with Employee Selection. Participants completed nine items 
measuring their prior hiring experience (Nolan et al., 2016; see Appendix A). Participants 
rated their experience with various hiring practices on a 5-point scale (1 = “never”, 2 = “a 
few times”, 3 = “somewhat often”, 4 = “often”, 5 = “very often”). 
Cognitive Ability. Participants completed a 10-item test from the International 
Cognitive Ability Resource Project (ICAR; Condon & Revelle, 2014). The test consists 
of two types of items: verbal reasoning and numerical reasoning (See Appendix B).  
General Decision-Making Style (GDMS). The GDMS assesses how individuals 
approach decision situations, and distinguishes between five decision styles: rational, 
avoidant, dependent, intuitive, and spontaneous (Scott & Bruce, 1995; see Appendix C 
for descriptions of and items for each decision-making style). Participants indicated the 
extent to which they agreed or disagreed with each item using a 5-point scale (1 = 
“strongly disagree”, 2 = “disagree”, 3 = “neither agree nor disagree”, 4 = “agree”, 5 = 
“strongly agree”). 
Resistance to Scientific Personnel Selection Methods. Participants completed a 
20-item questionnaire developed by Weinhardt and Beck (2017) to measure their 
perceptions of the fairness and usefulness of algorithms and standardized tests (See 
Appendix D).  
Demographics. Participants self-reported on the following demographic variables: 
gender, age, ethnic background, education level, and employment status. 
Subjective Perceptions. After making predictions, participants rated how 
important they considered the anchors were on a 5-point scale (1 = “not important”, 2 = 
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“slightly important”, 3 = “moderately important”, 4 = “important”, 5 = “very important”) 
and whether they have based their judgments on the anchors provided on a 5-point scale 
(1 = “disagree”, 2 = “slightly disagree”, 3 = “neither agree nor disagree”, 4 = “slightly 
agree”, 5 = “agree”).  
Procedure 
Upon providing consent to participate in the study, participants read the 
background information of the decision scenario they would encounter and descriptions 
of the data they would use to make subsequent decisions. Then, participants answered 
eight validity check questions2 to determine if they have read the background information 
carefully (See Appendix E). Participants then predicted the extent to which each 
employee would exhibit counterproductive work behaviors on the job (40 predictions in 
total) based on the Big Five personality scores (See Appendix F for an example). 
For participants who were not in the control condition, prior to making each 
prediction, they were randomly assigned to (depending on which condition they belonged 
to) receive either the high-precision anchor, a judgment value with one decimal point 
(e.g., 92.2), or the low-precision anchor, a judgment value to the nearest 10th with no 
decimal point (e.g., 90). They also received one of the following instructions depending 
on the condition they were assigned to: 1) the anchors were obtained by applying a pre-
determined formula to combine the five personality scores (i.e., the mechanical 
condition), 2) the anchors were expert predictions provided by a professional assessor 
who had access to the five personality scores (i.e., the clinical condition), or 3) the 
																																																								
2 The eighth validity check question was removed when scoring validity check scores because 
nearly half of the participants failed the question. 
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anchors were obtained by statistically modeling judgments from an expert who had 
access to the five personality scores and then applying the expert's model to combine the 
five personality scores (i.e., the hybrid condition). Despite the different instructions about 
the source of anchors, participants in all three anchor source conditions received the same 
anchor value for each employee they predicted, and the anchor value was obtained by 
applying unit weighting to the five predictors. Consistent with previous research the 
anchoring effect was induced by asking each participant to evaluate whether the provided 
anchor was too high, too low, or appropriate given the predictor data (i.e., the 
comparative judgment), and then provided their own judgment (i.e., the absolute 
judgment) of each employee using a scale from 0-100 (where 0 = very likely to exhibit 
counterproductive work behaviors and 100 = very unlikely to exhibit counterproductive 
work behaviors). Participants in the control condition did not receive any anchors prior to 
making predictions.  
After making judgments of the employees, participants provided subjective 
perceptions of the anchors and four commonly used decision-making methods. Then, 
participants completed demographic questions and measures of individual differences.  
Analyses 
Dependent Variables 
Two parameters were estimated to determine the magnitude of anchoring3. The 
absolute deviation of each judgement from the anchor was calculated, and the absolute 
deviation scores across 40 predictions were averaged to obtain an average deviation score 
																																																								
3 For participants who did not receive anchors, magnitude of anchoring was calculated between 
participant judgments and what the anchors would have been. 
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for each participant. The correlation between participant judgments and anchors was also 
estimated for each participant. Both the average deviation score and the anchor-judgment 
correlation quantify the magnitude of anchoring. A greater average deviation score 
indicates more adjustment from the anchor and therefore a weaker anchoring effect. A 
higher anchor-judgment correlation indicates a stronger anchoring effect. Participants 
also reported their subjective perceptions of the anchors presented to them (i.e., 
importance and use of anchors). 
To model the decision policy of each participant, the framework of Brunswik’s 
(1952) Lens Model was used. According to the Lens Model, human judgments and 
values of the environmental criterion can be described as linear combinations of 
environmental cues. By comparing these two linear models, one can evaluate the nature 
of how the human judge combines cues to yield a judgment and whether the human 
judgment policy corresponds to the model of the environment. Moreover, human 
judgment is predictive of the environmental criterion to the extent that the human judge 
utilizes cues in a similar way as the environment. Therefore, judgmental accuracy (!"), 
can be decomposed by the Lens Model equation (Tucker, 1964, p. 528): !" = $%&%' + ) (1 − %&-)(1 − %'-) 
In the equation, judgmental accuracy (!") can be determined by correlating the 
human judgment with the environmental criterion. Linear knowledge ($) measures the 
extent to which predictions of the model of the judge match predictions of the model of 
the environment, and can be computed by correlating predicted judgments from the 
model of the judge with predicted criterion values from the model of the environment. 
Response consistency (%') measures how consistently the human judge uses cues, and 
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can be computed by correlating predicted judgments from the model of the judge with 
actual judgments. Environmental predictability (%&) measures how well the criterion 
could be predicted with a linear model of the environmental cues, and can be computed 
by correlating predicted criterion values from the model of the environment with the 
actual criterion values. The last parameter, residual correlation ())4, measures the 
correlation between the residuals of the models of the environment and the judge, and 
thus captures the shared part between the human judgment policy and the environmental 
structure that could not be captured by the linear models. 
Because anchors were estimated with the unit-weighting approach, it is possible 
for participants to outperform the anchors when predicting the criterion (i.e., CWB). To 
assess the performance of each participant relative to the anchors, the accuracy of anchors 
was first determined by correlating anchors with the criterion values, and then the relative 
accuracy of each participant was estimated by subtracting the accuracy of anchors from 
the accuracy of participant judgments. A positive value indicates the participant 
outperforms the anchors and a negative value indicates the participant underperforms the 
anchors. Further analyses used judgment accuracy, relative accuracy, linear knowledge, 
and response consistency as dependent variables. Hypotheses were only formed with 
judgment accuracy and analyses with relative accuracy, linear knowledge and response 
consistency were exploratory.  
To capture the weighting policy of each participant, participant judgments were 
regressed on the five personality scores at the participant level and standardized 
																																																								
4 Further analyses were not conducted on residual correlation due to negligible magnitudes (the 
average of residual correlation in the whole sample is .03). 
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regression coefficients of each personality score were obtained. To ensure weights were 
comparable across participants, the relative weight of each personality score was 
estimated by dividing the standardized regression coefficient by the sum of the 
coefficients across all five predictors. The standard deviation of predictor weights was 
also computed to assess weight variation. 
Analyses 
To test whether providing human judges with predictions from an external source 
would affect the decision policy and the accuracy of their judgments, independent-groups 
t-tests were conducted comparing estimates of magnitude of anchoring, each Lens Model 
parameter (i.e., judgment accuracy, linear knowledge, response consistency, 
environmental predictability5), and the weighting policy between participants who 
received anchors with those in the control condition. Multiple regressions were 
performed to test the effects of anchor features (i.e., source and precision) on the 
magnitude of anchoring and Lens Model parameters.  
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients were computed to assess the 
correlation of each individual difference variable with the magnitude of anchoring and 
Lens Model parameters. Moderated regressions were conducted to test the interactions of 
individual differences with anchor source. Each dependent variable (i.e., average 
deviation, anchor-judgment correlation, and judgment accuracy) was regressed on anchor 
source, the individual difference variable (mean centered), and the interaction term.  
																																																								
5 Differences in environmental predictability were tested to ensure comparable task predictability 
between conditions. 
		 45 
Results 
Data Cleaning 
The initial data set was cleaned based on the following criteria. First, 12 
participants were removed because they did not complete the study or provided text 
instead of numerical responses for the judgment task and thus were not interpretable. 
Then the comparative judgment was compared with the absolute judgment to assess level 
of correspondence. When the option “too high” was selected for the comparative 
judgment, and the deviation of the absolute judgment from the anchor was negative (i.e., 
they adjusted downward as they thought the anchor was too high given the predictor 
values), correspondence was coded as 1 and other responses were coded as 0. When the 
option “too low” was selected, and the deviation of the absolute judgment from the 
anchor was positive (i.e., they adjusted upward as they thought the anchor was too low 
given the predictor values), correspondence was coded as 1 and other responses were 
coded as 0. When the option “just appropriate” was selected, and the absolute deviation 
of the absolute judgment from the anchor was less than 5 points, correspondence was 
coded as 1 and other responses were coded as 0. Then correspondence scores were 
averaged across the 40 predictions made to determine the level of correspondence for 
each participant and a low level of correspondence indicates careless responding. 144 
participants who had a low level of correspondence (< .81)6 were excluded from the data 
set. Additionally, 10 participants completed the study in less than 14 minutes7 and did not 																																																								
6 This cutoff was determined by Q1-1.5IQR, where Q1 = .925 was the first quartile of 
correspondence and IQR = .075 was the interquartile range of correspondence. Scores lower than 
this cutoff were considered as outliers. 
7 This cutoff was 1/3 of the median of the completion time, which was considered as the lower-
bound of the legitimate time required to complete the study. 
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get full credit for validity check questions, and therefore were excluded. The final data set 
consisted of 1,234 participants (52.9% females, Mage = 39.24) who provided valid 
responses. 
Effects of External Predictions 
Results of independent groups t-tests indicated that participants who received 
anchors (M = 10.14, SD = 3.93) showed significantly lower average deviation score than 
the control condition (M = 17.49, SD = 5.66), t(222.05) = -17.14 , p < .001. Differences 
in anchor-judgment correlation were also significant between participants who received 
anchors (M = .87, SD = .11) and the control condition (M = .68, SD = .27), t(198.92) = 
9.57, p < .001. Therefore, anchoring was successfully induced in the present study. 
Participants who received anchors (M = .41, SD = .14) showed significantly 
higher accuracy than the control condition (M = .38, SD = .20), t(220.76) = 2.28, p = .02. 
Therefore, hypothesis 1 was supported. Participants who received anchors (M = .94, SD 
= .07) also showed significantly higher response consistency than the control condition 
(M = .89, SD = .13), t(205.64) = 5.26, p < .001. Differences in linear knowledge between 
participants who received anchors (M = .76, SD = .18) and the control condition (M = .71, 
SD = .33), t(209.15) = 1.89, p =.06 were in the hypothesized direction. Differences in 
environmental predictability were not significant between participants who received 
anchors (M = .45, SD = .16) and the control condition (M = .45, SD = .15), t(1232) = 
-.37, p = .71 as was expected due to the randomization of stimulus material across 
conditions. Figure 1 illustrates how judgment accuracy, response consistency, and 
magnitude of anchoring differ between participants who received anchors and those who 
did not receive anchors.  
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Participants who received anchors (M = .12, SD = .10) placed greater weight on 
Extraversion than the control condition (M = .00, SD = .61), t(189.96) = 2.81, p = .01. 
Participants who received anchors (M = .12, SD = .11) also placed greater weight on 
Openness than the control condition (M = .03, SD = .41), t(192.76) = 2.84, p < .01. 
Participants who received anchors (M = .30, SD = .14) placed less weight on 
Conscientiousness than the control condition (M = .46, SD = .33), t(200.47) = -6.24, p 
< .001. When comparing weight variation, those who received anchors (M = .12, SD 
= .14) showed less variation of weights across predictors than the control condition (M 
= .28, SD = .43), t(195.49) = -5.07, p < .001. There were not significant differences in the 
weight placed on Agreeableness between participants who received anchors (M = .23, SD 
= .22) and the control condition (M = .23, SD = .34), t(217.69) = -.12, p =.91. Differences 
of weight on Emotional Stability were also not significant between participants who 
received anchors (M = .23, SD = .14) and the control condition (M = .28, SD = .39), 
t(197.19) = -1.93, p =.06.  
Effects of Anchor Features 
Table 3 shows results of regressing the magnitude of anchoring on anchor source 
and anchor precision. Precision significantly predicted the average deviation score, β = 
-.07, t(1041) = -2.41, p = .02, indicating that participants showed stronger anchoring 
when anchors were presented at a precise level. Neither source nor precision had 
significant effects on anchor-judgment correlation. Therefore, hypothesis 2a was not 
supported. Hypothesis 2c was partially supported when anchoring was measured as 
average deviation score. Source significantly predicted importance and use of anchors. 
Specifically, participants in the clinical condition (β = -.13, t(1041) = -3.63, p < .001) and 
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those in the hybrid condition (β = -.08, t(1041) = -2.18, p = .03) perceived anchors as less 
important than those in the mechanical condition. Participants in the clinical condition (β 
= -.09, t(1041) = -2.61, p = .01) also reported less use of anchors than those in the 
mechanical condition. 
Table 4 shows results of regressing each of the Lens Model parameters on source 
and precision. The interaction of clinical x precise was significant when predicting 
judgment accuracy, β = -.12, t(1039) = -2.14, p = .03, relative accuracy, β = -.14, t(1039) 
= -2.52, p = .01, linear knowledge, β = -.13, t(1039) = -2.35, p = .02, and response 
consistency, β = -.11, t(1039) = -2.03, p = .04. The clinical x precise interaction for 
accuracy is plotted in Figure 2. The clinical x precise interaction for relative accuracy is 
plotted in Figure 3. The clinical x precise interaction for linear knowledge is plotted in 
Figure 4. The clinical x precise interaction for response consistency is plotted in Figure 5. 
Simple slope analyses were conducted to interpret the interactions. Results are shown in 
Table 5. When anchors were precise, participants who received clinical anchors showed 
lower accuracy, β = -.13, t(514) = -2.52, p = .01, lower relative accuracy, β = -.13, t(514) 
= -2.55, p = .01, and lower linear knowledge, β = -.13, t(514) = -2.48, p = .01, than those 
who received mechanical anchors. When anchors were rounded, participants who 
received clinical anchors showed higher consistency than those who received mechanical 
anchors, β = .10, t(525) = 2.02, p = .04. Therefore, neither hypothesis 2b nor hypothesis 
2d was supported. A summary of descriptive statistics of the magnitude of anchoring and 
the Lens Model parameters by condition is shown in Table 6. 
Correlations between the magnitude of anchoring and Lens Model parameters are 
shown in Table 7. Both average deviation (r = -.43) and anchor-judgment correlation (r 
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= .61) were correlated with response consistency. More specifically, participants who 
were more consistent tended to show less deviation from anchors and their predictions 
were more related to anchors. Contrary to the hypothesis, only anchor-judgment 
correlation was weakly associated with judgment accuracy (r = .11). Exploratory 
analyses were conducted to further examine the relationship between the magnitude of 
anchoring and accuracy. Polynomial regression was performed to estimate the 
relationship between average deviation and relative accuracy. As shown in Table 8, 
adding the quadratic term significantly increased R2 (from .00 to .03). As shown in Figure 
6, when relative accuracy was negative (i.e., participants underperformed anchors), more 
deviation was associated with lower relative accuracy; when relative accuracy was 
positive (i.e., participants outperformed anchors), more deviation was associated with 
higher relative accuracy. Participants were then separated into two groups based on 
relative accuracy: outperformers (whose relative accuracy was positive) and 
underperformers (whose relative accuracy was negative). Among outperformers, average 
deviation was positively correlated with relative accuracy, r(667) = .38, p < .001 and 
judgment accuracy, r(667) = .10, p = .01. Among underperformers, average deviation 
was negatively correlated with relative accuracy, r(374) = -.43, p < .001 and judgment 
accuracy, r(374) = -.17, p < .001. 
Effects of Individual Differences 
Table 9 shows the correlations of individual difference variables with the 
magnitude of anchoring and the Lens Model parameters. Table 10 shows the correlations 
among individual difference variables. One individual difference variable was 
significantly correlated with the magnitude of anchoring. Specifically, participants who 
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had more prior experience with hiring tended to score higher on average deviation score 
(r =.12), and lower on anchor-judgment correlation (r = -.09). Therefore, hypothesis 3a 
was supported. Hypotheses 3b-3d were not supported. As for subjective perceptions of 
anchors, participants who perceived anchors as more important tended to have more prior 
experience (r = .10), score lower on cognitive ability (r = -.22), and score higher on 
dependent (r =.11), intuitive (r = .20), and spontaneous (r = .07). Participants who self-
reported more use of anchors tended to score lower on cognitive ability (r = -.22), and 
higher on dependent (r = .13), intuitive (r =.18), and spontaneous (r = .08), and perceive 
scientific personnel selection method as less unfair (r = -.07). 
Two variables were significantly correlated with judgment accuracy: participants 
with higher judgment accuracy tended to have less prior experience (r = -.08), and score 
higher on cognitive ability (r = .14). Participants who showed higher relative accuracy 
tended to have less prior experience in hiring (r = -.11), score higher on cognitive ability 
(r = .20) and rational (r = .08), and score lower on intuitive (r = -.09) and spontaneous (r 
= -.09). For participants who scored higher on linear knowledge, they tended to have less 
prior experience (r = -.08), score higher on cognitive ability (r = .15), and score lower on 
intuitive (r = -.07) and spontaneous (r = -.06). All the individual difference variables 
except dependent style were significantly associated with response consistency: 
participants who were more consistent tended to have less prior experience (r = -.14), 
score higher on cognitive ability (r = .30), rational (r = .14), score lower on avoidant (r = 
-.07), intuitive (r = -.10), spontaneous (r = -.14), and perceive scientific personnel 
selection methods as more useful (r = -.07).  
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Table 11 shows regression results for significant interactions when predicting 
anchoring. Table 12 shows regression results for significant interactions when predicting 
accuracy. Results of hypothesized interactions were reported first, followed by 
exploratory analyses of other interactions. None of the hypothesized interactions of 
individual difference variables with anchor source when predicting anchoring were 
significant (i.e., Hypotheses 4a-4d). However, the interaction of cognitive ability x hybrid 
was significant when predicting average deviation, β = -.10, t(1039) = -2.19, p = .03. 
Simple slope analyses showed that cognitive ability predicted average deviation only in 
the mechanical condition, β = .13, t(342) = 2.43, p = .02. 
When predicting accuracy, several individual differences x source interactions 
were significant. The interaction of clinical x experience was significant, β = .10, t(1039) 
= 2.33, p = .02. Simple slope analyses showed that experience predicted accuracy only in 
the mechanical condition, β = -.19, t(342) = -3.58, p < .001. The interaction of clinical x 
cognitive ability was significant, β = .12, t(1039) = 2.63, p = .01. Simple slope analyses 
showed that cognitive ability predicted accuracy only in the clinical condition, β = .23, 
t(353) = 4.43, p < .001. The interaction of clinical x unfairness was significant, β = -.12, 
t(1039) = -2.66, p = .01. Simple slope analyses showed that unfairness predicted accuracy 
only in the clinical condition, β = -.12, t(353) = -2.29,  p = .02. The interaction of clinical 
x unusefulness was significant, β = -.15, t(1039) = -3.30, p < .001. Simple slope analyses 
showed that unusefulness predicted accuracy only in the clinical condition, β = -.16, 
t(353) = -3.05,  p < .01. 
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Discussion 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effectiveness of eliciting a favorable 
anchoring effect to improve hiring decision-making. Specifically, the study examines 
whether 1) providing predictions from an external source (i.e., anchors) will affect the 
decision policy and the accuracy of human judgment, 2) features of the anchors (i.e., 
source and precision) will affect the magnitude of anchoring and the accuracy of human 
judgment, 3) individual differences predict susceptibility to anchoring, and 4) individual 
differences interact with features of the anchors when predicting the magnitude of 
anchoring.  
Overall, a number of important findings were obtained. First, providing external 
predictions as a decision aid increased consistency and accuracy of human judgment and 
influenced how individuals assigned weights to different predictors. Second, the 
magnitude of anchoring was increased when anchors were presented at a more precise 
level. Effects on judgment accuracy were more complicated: when anchors were 
presented at a precise level, individuals who were informed that the anchors were 
provided by an expert showed slightly lower accuracy than those who were informed that 
the anchors were obtained from a statistical formula. Third, the magnitude of anchoring 
decreased among individuals with more prior experience in employee selection. Finally, 
only cognitive ability interacted with anchor source when predicting the magnitude of 
anchoring, and several interactions emerged when predicting judgment accuracy. The 
following section discusses each of the findings in more detail. 
The fact that participants who received anchors showed a fairly high correlation 
between their judgments and the anchors (mean r = .87) when compared to those who did 
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not receive anchors (mean r = .68) indicates that the anchoring effect was successfully 
induced in the context of hiring decision-making. Different patterns in the weighting 
policy of individuals who received anchors and who did not lend further support to the 
robustness of the anchoring effect. In this study, all participants were explicitly told that 
Agreeableness, Emotional Stability, and especially Conscientiousness are more predictive 
of the outcome than the other two predictors (i.e., Extraversion and Openness). Without 
additional information (i.e., anchors), participants were supposed to place greater weight 
on those three predictors. On the other hand, those who received anchors would assign 
similar weight to each predictor and thus would show less variation across predictor 
weights because their judgments would be more aligned with the anchors, which were 
unit-weighted composites of the five predictors. This was supported by the results: 
individuals who received anchors placed greater weight on Extraversion and Openness 
(two predictors that are less predictive of CWB), less weight on Conscientiousness (the 
best predictor of CWB), and showed less weight variation when compared with the 
control condition. These results are likely due to greater emphasis being placed on the 
anchors in anchoring conditions. That is, the weight placed on Openness and 
Extraversion is likely indirect. Despite more emphasis being placed on less valid 
predictors, participants in the anchoring conditions still provided more valid predictions 
of CWB. The finding that participants who received anchors showed higher accuracy 
than those who did not receive anchors reveals that the anchoring effect, which is a robust 
decision heuristic that often leads to systematic biases, can be used to reduce bias of 
human judgment under certain circumstances.  
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These findings suggest that simple interventions such as providing predictions 
from an external source can influence how individuals integrate data to make decisions, 
and can increase the accuracy of their decisions. In a real hiring situation, if an entire 
reliance on statistical predictions is impossible due to resistance to using purely analytical 
approaches, providing decision makers with statistically combined predictions may help 
align human predictions with statistical predictions, and therefore increase judgment 
accuracy. 
In fact, anchors also increased the consistency of human judgment. Statistical 
methods tend to be superior because the inconsistency of human judges in applying 
weights undermines accuracy. The improvement in consistency in the presence of 
anchors may contribute to the increase in accuracy although the effect is not 
overwhelming. Prior research has shown that consistency did not always have a large 
effect on accuracy (Bisantz et al., 2000). As will be discussed later, consistency and 
accuracy was only moderately related (r = .28), and they demonstrated different patterns 
of associations with other variables examined in this study. It is possible that the 
predictability of which individual would be more likely to exhibit counterproductive 
work behaviors given their personality scores is not high enough, so accuracy is relatively 
insensitive to consistency.  
The results align with past research showing that compared with rounded anchors, 
precise anchors result in less adjustment and stronger anchoring (Janiszewski & Uy, 
2008). It was found that presenting anchors at a more precise level (i.e., numbers with 
one decimal point vs. numbers rounded to the nearest 10th) induced stronger anchoring 
among participants. The impact of the second feature, anchor source, was more complex. 
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As an extension of the clinical synthesis method, this study examined whether the 
magnitude of anchoring would vary depending on the source of anchors. Clinical 
synthesis is a data combination method in decision-making where human judges are 
provided with a statistically combined prediction in addition to the predictor data, and 
judges can decide how to integrate the statistical prediction with the rest of the data. On 
the other hand, with a purely clinical method, judges integrate the predictor data to reach 
an overall prediction without knowledge of the statistical prediction. Although some 
evidence suggests the clinical synthesis was more accurate than the clinical method, the 
magnitude of improvement was typically small (Sawyer, 1966). One explanation is that 
with the clinical synthesis, judges explicitly know the external prediction is obtained 
from a statistical model and they may not give any weight to the statistical prediction due 
to resistance to analytical approaches.  
In this study, information about the source of the external predictions was 
manipulated to vary along a holistic-analytical continuum. If the preference for holistic 
over analytical methods among most decision makers is prevalent, judges will be more 
likely to align their predictions with the anchors when they know the anchors are from a 
more holistic source. However, this was not supported by the results. Knowing that the 
anchors were obtained from an intuition-based source (i.e., expert judgment) did not 
increase the degree of anchoring among participants. In fact, contradictory findings were 
observed when examining the subjective measures of anchoring. Specifically, 
participants were more likely to self-report that they considered the anchors important 
and have based their predictions on the anchors when they were informed that the 
anchors are from an analytical source (i.e., a statistical model). As will be discussed later, 
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different results were obtained when comparing the objective (e.g., average deviation 
score) and subjective (e.g., importance) indicators of anchoring, and it may signal the 
unreliability of self-reported measures of anchoring. These results suggest that when 
providing decision makers with external predictions as a decision aid, the predictions 
should be presented as more precise numbers to enhance the potency of the numbers. 
However, knowing the source of the predictions did not affect the degree to which judges 
adopt the predictions. In other words, decision makers are no more likely to accept a 
decision aid when it comes from another human expert rather than a statistical model. 
The finding that the source of anchors did not influence the magnitude of anchoring 
provides tentative support for the selective accessibility approach to anchoring, which 
posits that comparing the target judgment with the anchor value increases the 
accessibility of anchor-consistent information about the target, and this increase is not 
dependent on the relevance of the anchor. 
The rationale for improving human judgment with anchors is that human 
predictions, when aligned with anchors, should be predictive of the outcome if the 
anchors have strong validity. In other words, the stronger the anchoring is and the more 
accurate the anchor is, the higher the accuracy of human judgment should be, and the 
effects of anchor features on anchoring should transfer to the effects on accuracy. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, the magnitude of anchoring was not highly correlated with 
accuracy, and different effects of anchor features on accuracy were observed. When 
examining differences in accuracy, a significant interaction between source and precision 
was observed: when anchors were presented at a precise level, participants who were 
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informed that the anchors were provided by an expert showed lower accuracy than those 
who were informed that the anchors were obtained from a statistical formula.  
One explanation for the weak association between anchoring and accuracy is that 
the anchors presented to participants were suboptimal predictions and it was possible for 
participants to outperform the anchors. Because participants were aware that three of the 
five predictors are more predictive than the other two, participants were likely to improve 
upon the anchors if they developed a weighting policy with greater weight on those three 
predictors. In other words, greater deviation from anchors resulting in weaker anchoring 
is not necessarily irrational and the relationship between anchoring and accuracy should 
not be linear. Exploratory analyses revealed a curvilinear relationship between anchoring 
and relative accuracy (i.e., the accuracy of human judgment relative to the accuracy of 
anchors): when participants outperformed the anchors and the more their predictions 
deviated from the anchors, the more improvement in accuracy they made beyond the 
anchors; when participants underperformed the anchors and the more their predictions 
deviated from the anchors, the more decrease in accuracy they had as compared to the 
anchors.  
The curvilinear relationship between anchoring and relative accuracy then 
transferred to the relationship between anchoring and accuracy: greater deviation from 
anchors was correlated with higher accuracy among participants who showed 
improvement over the anchors, while greater deviation was correlated with less accuracy 
among underperformers. In other words, stronger anchoring led to higher accuracy only 
when individuals did not develop a better weighting schema than unit weighting. When 
individuals were able to apply a weighting schema that was more accurate than unit 
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weighting, weaker anchoring implied reasonable adjustment and thus higher accuracy. 
One implication is that although human judgment generally underperforms a statistical 
model, some decision makers are able to improve upon the statistical model when 
additional information about how to develop and apply a more accurate weighting 
method exists. 
Although anchoring did not have a strong linear association with accuracy, its 
correlation with response consistency was rather high. Because anchors were unit-
weighted composites of the five predictors, a greater alignment between human 
predictions and the anchors implies a stronger linear association between human 
predictions and the predictors, and therefore higher consistency. In addition, effects of 
anchor features on consistency were not consistent with the effects on accuracy: when 
anchors were rounded, participants who were informed that the anchors were provided by 
an expert (i.e., the clinical condition) showed higher consistency than those who were 
informed that the anchors were obtained from a statistical formula (i.e., the mechanical 
condition). Recall that when anchors were precise, participants in the clinical condition 
showed lower accuracy than those in the mechanical condition. It should be noted that the 
patterns of the interaction effects were similar between accuracy (Figure 2) and 
consistency (Figure 5): when anchors were rounded, the clinical condition showed 
slightly higher consistency/accuracy than the mechanical condition, and the pattern was 
reversed when anchors were precise. Differences in the results of significance testing 
may be due to different effect sizes and the fact that consistency does not always have a 
large effect on accuracy. Moreover, the fact that individuals in the clinical condition 
showed the least improvement on the anchors when anchors were precise implies that 
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when external predictions are presented as precise numbers and from an intuition-based 
source, participants might have shown the greatest acceptance of the anchors and were 
less likely to outperform or underperform the anchors.   
In addition to the features of the anchors, this study examined whether individual 
differences predict susceptibility to anchoring and other aspects of decision-making. Prior 
experience with employee selection was the only individual difference variable that was 
associated with the magnitude of anchoring. Specifically, individuals who had more prior 
experience with hiring decisions showed weaker anchoring. This is inconsistent with the 
majority of prior studies showing that expert and novice judges are equally susceptible to 
anchoring (Englich & Mussweiler, 2001), but consistent with the hypothesis that 
experienced decision makers are more likely to rely on their own knowledge and 
strategies formed in past decisions instead of anchors when making decisions. The 
finding that cognitive ability was not correlated with anchoring is consistent with prior 
literature (Furnham et al., 2012; Stanovich & West, 2008). In addition, neither verbal 
reasoning nor numerical reasoning predicted the magnitude of anchoring and they 
showed similar patterns of associations with the dependent variables. This refutes the 
proposition that, at least these specific abilities, instead of general cognitive ability, may 
be more predictive of anchoring susceptibility. Little research has examined how decision 
styles predict anchoring susceptibility. Results of this study provide preliminary evidence 
that individuals with different decision styles, at least those measured by GDMS (Scott & 
Bruce, 1985), are equally susceptible to anchoring. The lack of associations between 
individual differences and anchoring demonstrates that the anchoring effect is quite 
robust and it affects the majority of decision makers regardless of their characteristics. 
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It should be noted that cognitive ability and three of the five decision styles (i.e., 
dependent, intuitive, and spontaneous) were correlated with the subjective perceptions of 
anchoring. Specifically, individuals lower on cognitive ability, or higher on dependent, 
intuitive, or spontaneous styles were more likely to self-report that they considered the 
anchors important and have based their predictions on the anchors. The discrepancies 
between objective and subjective indicators of anchoring reflect that self-reported 
measures of anchoring may not be reliable. Individuals may not be fully aware of their 
own decision policy or they may disguise their decision policy to be socially acceptable.  
Although individual differences did not predict anchoring susceptibility, some of 
them were correlated with consistency and accuracy of human judgment. More 
experience in employee selection was associated with lower consistency and accuracy. 
This is consistent with decision-making research showing that having prior experience in 
the domain does not necessarily improve the accuracy of one’s judgments, and may at 
times impede judgments (e.g., Garb, 1989; Oskamp, 1962). Instead of following 
instructions provided to them, experienced decision makers were more likely to rely on 
other decision rules, presumably those formed in past hiring decisions, which may not be 
optimal in this study. The finding that individuals higher on cognitive ability showed 
higher judgment consistency and accuracy provides further support that cognitive ability 
is one of the best predictors of many important life outcomes, even in the context of 
hiring decision-making.  
Although not directly associated with accuracy, individuals higher on the rational 
style and those lower on the avoidant, intuitive, or spontaneous style tended to be more 
consistent. The positive association between rational and consistency is not surprising 
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given that the rational style is characterized by deliberate thoughts and logical evaluations 
of alternatives, and has been found to be associated with positive outcomes, such as 
satisfaction with career choice (Crossley & Highhouse, 2005), high job performance 
(Russ, McNeilly, & Comer, 1996), and decision-making competence (Bruine de Bruin et 
al., 2007). On the other hand, individuals with the intuitive style tend to rely on hunches 
and feelings and those with the spontaneous style are characterized by a sense of 
immediacy and prefer to get through the decision-making process as soon as possible. 
Both intuitive and spontaneous styles are characterized by decisions being made 
relatively quickly, and thus are likely to be more error-prone and inconsistent (Russ et al., 
1996). It should be noted that decision styles are not mutually exclusive, and one can 
choose different styles when facing different decision scenarios (Scott & Bruce, 1995). 
Though it was not hypothesized, exploratory analyses revealed a significant 
interaction between cognitive ability and source when predicting anchoring such that 
higher cognitive ability was related to weaker anchoring only in the mechanical 
condition. This is counterintuitive given that individuals higher on cognitive ability tend 
to use logical evaluations rather than intuitions when making decisions, and should be 
more likely to accept anchors from a more analytical source. In other words, cognitive 
ability should be less predictive of anchoring in the mechanical condition. It is unclear 
what might have contributed to this interaction effect.  
When predicting accuracy, several interactions between individual differences 
and anchor source were observed. Caution should be given when interpreting those 
interaction effects and further research is needed to test the generalizability of those 
findings. First, a significant interaction between experience and source was found such 
		 62 
that more experience was associated with lower accuracy only in the mechanical 
condition. It is possible that experienced decision makers were more resistant to relying 
on external predictions that are obtained from a statistical source than an intuition-based 
source and instead they relied more on their own decision rules formed in past decisions 
that were not necessarily accurate. Second, a significant interaction between cognitive 
ability and source was found such that higher cognitive ability was associated with higher 
accuracy only in the clinical condition. Given the curvilinear relation between anchoring 
and accuracy and the fact that cognitive ability was not related to anchoring in the clinical 
condition, it is possible that individuals with relatively high cognitive ability tended to 
outperform the anchors while individuals with relatively low cognitive ability tended to 
underperform the anchors in the clinical condition. Even though the two groups showed 
similar levels of deviation from anchors, more deviation from anchors was rational 
among high cognitive ability individuals and thus increased accuracy while more 
deviation was irrational among low cognitive ability individuals and thus decreased 
accuracy. As a result, the effect of cognitive ability on accuracy was stronger in the 
clinical condition.  
Finally, significant interactions were observed between anchor source and both 
measures of resistance to scientific personnel selection. Individuals who perceived 
scientific personnel selection as more unfair and unuseful showed lower accuracy only in 
the clinical condition. It is possible that individuals who were more resistant to statistical 
methods tended to underperform the anchors while individuals who were less resistant 
tended to outperform the anchors in the clinical condition. Even though they showed 
similar levels of deviation from anchors, more deviation from anchors was rational 
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among less resistant individuals and thus increased accuracy while more deviation was 
irrational among more resistant individuals and thus decreased accuracy. As a result, the 
effect of resistance on accuracy was stronger in the clinical condition. 
Limitations and Future Research 
One limitation of this study concerns the nature of the anchors presented to 
participants. In order to understand whether individuals could improve upon the external 
predictions provided to them, the external predictions were estimated using a suboptimal 
weighting policy of the predictors (i.e., simple unit weighting). Suboptimal anchors were 
used to allow judges to improve on the anchors and permit the inclusion of an incentive 
to help ensure commitment to the task.  However, one issue with using suboptimal 
predictions as anchors is that the relationship between the magnitude of anchoring and 
the accuracy of human judgment is not necessarily linear. In other words, weaker 
anchoring could result from either rational or irrational deviations from the anchors. 
Irrational deviations decrease accuracy while rational deviations increase accuracy. As a 
result, it is difficult to examine how the effects of anchor features and individual 
differences on the magnitude of anchoring will transfer to the effects on accuracy. Future 
research should consider using more optimal anchors, such as those obtained from linear 
regressions, to better understand how the accuracy of human judgment changes 
depending on the magnitude of anchoring. 
A related issue is how the control condition was set up in the study. All 
participants, including those in the control condition, were informed that three of the five 
predictors are more predictive of the criterion. This information can be considered as 
task-related knowledge, and even though the control condition did not receive anchors as 
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a decision aid, this task-related knowledge might have increased the accuracy of their 
predictions. Since the control group had information that would allow them to match or 
exceed the anchor, this served as a stricter test of anchoring. Therefore, the control 
condition would not serve as the lowest baseline of accuracy to be compared with those 
receiving anchors. Results showed that participants who received anchors showed higher 
accuracy than those who did not receive anchors. It is possible for the anchors to 
demonstrate greater improvement in accuracy without this task-related knowledge. Future 
research should create a control condition without any task-related knowledge about the 
validity of predictors to examine how anchors alone influence the accuracy of human 
judgment. 
Another limitation concerns the nature of the participants in the study. The fact 
that participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk might have 
contributed to the relatively low level of experience with hiring decisions in this sample 
(1.92 out of 5). As the majority of participants did not have greater experience in hiring, 
they were more likely to show a stronger anchoring effect when provided with the 
external predictions. The lack of variation in experience could also dilute the effects of 
experience on decision policy and accuracy. Ideally, future research should include 
participants from populations with higher level of experience, for instance, human 
resources practitioners, and diverse levels of experience to better understand how 
experience affects the effectiveness of anchoring for improving hiring decision-making. 
A final direction for future research is to examine the relationship between 
response consistency and judgment accuracy. It is unclear why consistency was not 
highly correlated with accuracy and the two features of anchors showed different impacts 
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on response consistency and judgment accuracy. Future research should look into how 
response consistency contributes to judgment accuracy. If consistency is not highly 
correlated to accuracy, more research should examine what factors may account for 
individual differences in accuracy for the same judgment. 
Conclusion 
This study examined the effectiveness of eliciting a favorable anchoring effect to 
improve hiring decision-making. Results suggest that providing decision makers with 
predictions from an external source affects their decision policy and increases the 
accuracy of human judgment. The presentation of the anchors affects the degree of 
anchoring such that there is a greater degree of anchoring when anchors are presented as 
precise, rather than rounded numbers. However, knowing that the external predictions 
come from a human expert rather than a statistical model does not increase the reliance of 
decision makers on the external predictions.  
An intriguing finding is that although extensive evidence suggests statistical data 
combination methods are generally superior to human judgment, some decision makers 
are able to develop and apply a more accurate weighting method than the statistical 
method when provided with task-related knowledge. As a result, the accuracy of human 
judgment outperforms that of the statistical model (although an intentionally less accurate 
one). 
Finally, the anchoring effect is a ubiquitous phenomenon in human judgment as 
individuals with different characteristics are equally susceptible to anchoring. Moreover, 
judgment consistency and accuracy demonstrate greater associations with individual 
differences including experience, cognitive ability, and certain decision-making styles. 
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Overall the results suggest decision makers can be selected and then trained to be more 
consistent and accurate in their judgments. 
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Table 1. Descriptions of Six Studies Comparing Clinical Synthesis with Clinical or Mechanical Method 
Citation Criterion Sample (Judges) 
Statistical Information Accuracy Statistic Accuracy 
  Clinical Method 
Mechanical 
Method 
Clinical 
Synthesis 
Leli and Filskov 
(1981) 
Brain 
Impairment 
6 clinical psychologists and 6 
graduate students in clinical 
psychology 
Linear discriminant functions along 
with raw scores, unstandardized 
lambda weights, and classifications 
based on each function 
Hit rate 41% 62% 50% 
Leli and Filskov 
(1984) 
Intellectual 
Deterioration 
5 clinical psychologists and 5 
pre-doctoral interns in clinical 
psychology 
Discriminant function along with raw 
scores, unstandardized lambda 
weights, and classifications based on 
the function 
Hit rate 
62.5% 
(Interns) 
58.3% 
(Clinicians) 
83.3% 
66.5% 
(Interns)  
75% 
(Clinicians) 
Perez (1976) Homicidality 
6 graduate students in clinical 
psychology (2 first-year 
students, 2 practicum students, 
and 2 interns) 
Formulas of a multivariate analysis Hit rate 51% 83% 58% 
Melton (1952) Academic Performance 
12 college counselors who were 
graduate students in psychology 
or educational psychology 
An actuarial table where one can 
identify the predicted criterion value 
by finding the intersection of 
predictor values along the column 
and the row 
Mean 
absolute 
error 
0.45 0.35 0.45 
Watley and 
Vance (1964) 
Academic 
Performance 
66 counselors and 45 naïve 
judges (primarily freshmen and 
sophomore students) 
Expectancy table, correlation matrix, 
and multiple regression equation Hit rate 66.6% 79% 66.9% 
Harris (1963) Outcomes of Football Games 
8 football coaches and 
Litkenhous (who developed the 
mathematical formula) 
Predictions of a mathematical 
formula based on past performance Hit rate - 66% 
60% 
(Coaches) 
63% 
(Litkenhous) 
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Table 2. Descriptions of Experimental Conditions 
Number Condition Anchor Source Instruction Example Anchor Precision Instruction Example 
1 Control (no anchors) - - 
2 Mechanical, high-precision 
To guide your judgment, below is a prediction 
obtained by applying a pre-determined formula to 
combine the five personality scores. 
The predicted integrity score based on 
the formula for Mark is: 64.8 (on a 
scale from 0 to 100) 
3 Mechanical, low-precision 
To guide your judgment, below is a prediction 
obtained by applying a pre-determined formula to 
combine the five personality scores. 
The predicted integrity score based on 
the formula for Mark is: 60  
(on a scale from 0 to 100) 
4 Hybrid, high-precision 
To guide your judgment, below is a prediction 
obtained by statistically modeling judgments from 
an expert who has access to the five personality 
scores and then applying the expert's model to 
combine the five personality scores. 
The predicted integrity score based on 
the expert’s statistical model for Mark 
is: 64.8 (on a scale from 0 to 100) 
5 Hybrid, low-precision 
To guide your judgment, below is a prediction 
obtained by statistically modeling judgments from 
an expert who has access to the five personality 
scores and then applying the expert's model to 
combine the five personality scores. 
The predicted integrity score based on 
the expert’s statistical model for Mark 
is: 60  
(on a scale from 0 to 100) 
6 Clinical, high-precision 
To guide your judgment, below is an expert's 
prediction provided by a professional assessor 
who has access to the five personality scores. 
The predicted integrity score based on 
the expert judgment for Mark is: 64.8 
(on a scale from 0 to 100) 
7 Clinical, low-precision 
To guide your judgment, below is an expert's 
prediction provided by a professional assessor 
who has access to the five personality scores. 
The predicted integrity score based on 
the expert judgment for Mark is: 60  
(on a scale from 0 to 100) 
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Table 3. Regressions of Magnitude of Anchoring on Anchor Features (N = 1045) 
  Average Deviation   Ancho-Judgment Correlation   Importance   Use 
  B SE B β   B SE B β   B SE B β   B SE B β 
Clinical -.11 .30 -.01  .00 .01 .00  -.28 .08 -.13***  -.24 .09 -.09** 
Hybrid .10 .30 .01  .00 .01 .00  -.17 .08 -.08*  -.15 .09 -.06 
Precise -.59 .24  -.07*  .00 .01 .00  .01 .06 .00  -.14 .07 -.06 
R2 .01    .00    .01    .01   
F 2.11     .01     4.46**   3.46*   
Note. Clinical was coded as 0 if participants were in the mechanical or hybrid condition, and 1 if participants were in the clinical 
condition. Hybrid was coded as 0 if participants were in the mechanical or clinical condition, and 1 if participants were in the hybrid 
condition. Precise was coded as 0 if participants received rounded anchors, and 1 if participants received precise anchors. Interaction 
terms were dropped due to insignificance. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001 
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Table 4. Regressions of Lens Model Parameters on Anchor Features (N = 1045) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Clinical was coded as 0 if participants were in the mechanical or hybrid condition, and 1 if participants were in the clinical 
condition. Hybrid was coded as 0 if participants were in the mechanical or clinical condition, and 1 if participants were in the hybrid 
condition. Precise was coded as 0 if participants received rounded anchors, and 1 if participants received precise anchors. 
* p < .05 
  
 Judgment Accuracy  Relative Accuracy  Linear Knowledge  Response Consistency 
 B SE B β  B SE B β  B SE B β  B SE B β 
Clinical .01 .01 .02  .01 .01 .05  .01 .02 .03  .01 .01 .10 
Hybrid -.02 .01 -.06  -.00 .01 -.03  -.02 .02 -.04  .01 .01 .05 
Precise .01 .01 .04  .00 .01 .02  .01 .02 .04  .01 .01 .08 
Clinical x Precise -.04 .02 -.12*  -.03 .01 -.14*  -.06 .03 -.13*  -.02 .01 -.11* 
Hybrid x Precise -.01 .02 -.03  -.00 .01 -.01  -.02 .03 -.04  -.01 .01 -.06 
R2 .01    .01    .01    .00   
F 2.21    2.49*    2.29*    .93   
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Table 5. Regressions of Lens Model Parameters on Anchor Source by Anchor Precision (N = 1045) 
  Judgment Accuracy   Relative Accuracy 
 Rounded   Precise  Rounded   Precise 
  B SE B β   B SE B β   B SE B β   B SE B β 
Clinical .01 .01 .02  -.04 .02 -.13*  .01 .01 .05  -.02 .01 -.13* 
Hybrid -.02 .01 -.07  -.03 .02 -.09  -.00 .01 -.03  -.01 .01 -.04 
R2 .01    .01    .00    .01   
F 1.69    3.39*   1.18   3.45*  
 Linear Knowledge   Response Consistency 
 Rounded   Precise  Rounded   Precise 
 B SE B β   B SE B β   B SE B β   B SE B β 
Clinical .01 .02 .04  -.05 .02 -.13*  .01 .01 .10*  -.01 .01 -.05 
Hybrid -.02 .02 -.05  -.04 .02 -.09  .01 .01 .05  -.00 .01 -.03 
R2 .01    .01    .01    .00   
F 1.34    3.22*   2.05   .42   
Note. Clinical was coded as 0 if participants were in the mechanical or hybrid condition, and 1 if participants were in the clinical 
condition. Hybrid was coded as 0 if participants were in the mechanical or clinical condition, and 1 if participants were in the hybrid 
condition.  
* p < .05 
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Table 6. Descriptive Statistics of the Magnitude of Anchoring and Lens Model Parameters 
  Average Deviation  
Anchor-
Judgment 
Correlation 
 Importance  Use  Accuracy  Relative Accuracy  
Linear 
Knowledge  
Response 
Consistency 
Condition Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
Control 17.49 5.66  .68 .27  - -  - -  .38 .20  - -  .71 .33  .89 .13 
ML 10.37 3.48  .87 .10  3.68 0.93  3.72 1.07  .42 .13  .03 .08  .76 .18  .94 .08 
MH 9.91 3.67  .88 .10  3.74 1.05  3.53 1.14  .43 .13  .03 .08  .78 .16  .95 .06 
CL 10.28 3.89  .87 .10  3.45 1.09  3.49 1.24  .42 .13  .04 .09  .78 .17  .95 .04 
CH 9.85 4.82  .86 .17  3.40 1.01  3.27 1.27  .39 .14  .01 .09  .73 .22  .94 .09 
HL 10.64 3.74  .87 .10  3.53 1.09  3.47 1.31  .40 .13  .02 .08  .75 .16  .94 .06 
HH 9.84 4.16  .87 .11  3.54 1.04  3.47 1.26  .40 .14  .02 .09  .74 .19  .94 .06 
Note. ML = Mechanical, low precision condition. MH = Mechanical, high precision condition. CL = Clinical, low precision condition. 
CH = Clinical, high precision condition. HL = Hybrid, low precision condition. HH = Hybrid, high precision condition. 
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Table 7. Correlations between the Magnitude of Anchoring and Lens Model Parameters 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Magnitude of Anchoring         
1. Average Deviation -        
2. Anchor-Judgment Correlation -.85** -       
    3. Importance -.28** .21** -      
    4. Use -.30** .22** .64**      
Lens Model Parameters         
5. Accuracy -.02 .11** -.05 -.03 -    
6. Relative Accuracy .02 .02 -.15** -.15** .42** -   
7. Linear knowledge .04 .06* -.11** -.12** .74** .26** -  
8. Response Consistency -.43** .61** -.07* -.07* .28** .37** .27** - 
M 10.14 .87 3.56 3.49 .41 .03 .76 .94 
SD 3.94 .11 1.04 1.22 .14 .09 .18 .07 
Note. N = 1045. M = Mean. SD = Standard Deviation.  
* p < .05. ** p < .01 
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Table 8. Polynomial Regression of Average Deviation on Relative Accuracy (N = 1045) 
  Model 1   Model 2 
  B SE B β   B SE B β 
Linear .98 1.44 .02  .91 1.34 .02 
Quadratic     83.01 6.58 .36 
R2 .00    .03   
F for change in R2       36.10***  
*** p < .001 
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Table 9. Correlations of Individual Differences with Dependent Variables 
Individual 
Differences 
 Dependent Variables 
  
Average 
Deviation 
Anchor-
Judgment 
Correlation 
Importance Use Judgment Accuracy 
Relative 
Accuracy 
Linear 
Knowledge 
Response 
Consistency 
   Experience .12** -.09** .10** .05 -.08** -.11** -.08* -.14** 
   Cognitive Ability .02 .00 -.22** -.22** .14** .20** .15** .30** 
Decision Styles         
   Rational .00 .06 .02 .01 .05 .08* .05 .14** 
   Avoidant .00 -.04 .01 .00 .02 -.03 .00 -.07* 
   Dependent -.05 .03 .11** .13** -.02 -.01 -.04 -.02 
   Intuitive -.02 .01 .20** .18** -.02 -.09** -.07* -.10** 
   Spontaneous .00 -.02 .07* .08** -.04 -.09** -.06* -.14** 
Resistance         
   Unfairness .00 -.02 -.03 -.07* -.01 .00 -.01 -.04 
   Unusefulness .01 .00 .00 -.02 -.03 -.05 -.01 -.07* 
Note. N = 1045 for Average Deviation, Anchor-Judgment Correlation, Importance, Use. N = 1234 for Judgment Accuracy, Relative 
Accuracy, Linear Knowledge, and Response Consistency. Unfairness = a unit-weighted composite of fairness of algorithms and 
fairness of standardized tests, higher score indicates perceiving algorithms and standardized tests as less fair. Unusefulness = a unit-
weighted composite of usefulness of algorithms and usefulness of standardized tests, higher score indicates perceiving algorithms and 
standardized tests as less useful. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01 
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Table 10. Correlations among Individual Differences 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Experience -         
2. Cognitive Ability -.14** -        
Decision Styles          
3. Rational .00 .13** -       
4. Avoidant -.09** -.02 -.25** -      
5. Dependent -.03 -.06 .06* .27** -     
6. Intuitive .09** -.15** -.25** .10** .11** -    
7. Spontaneous .11** -.14** -.55** .21** .00 .54 -   
Resistance          
8. Unfairness -.05 .02 -.10** .20** .08** .08** .10** -  
9. Unusefulness -.05 -.10** -.09** .09** -.04 .17** .12** .50** - 
M 1.92 0.06 4.13 2.31 3.10 3.15 2.29 0.00 0.00 
SD 0.90 0.82 0.59 0.99 0.79 0.86 0.76 0.98 0.95 
Note. N = 1234. M = Mean. SD = Standard Deviation. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01 
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Table 11. Regression Results of Statistically Significant Individual Differences x Source 
Interactions When Predicting Anchoring 
  B SE B β 
Clinical -.11 .30 -.01 
Hybrid .08 .30 .01 
Experience .69 .27 .12* 
Clinical x Cognitive Ability -.60 .37 -.08 
Hybrid x Cognitive Ability -.83 .38 -.10* 
R2 .01   
F 1.23     
Note. Average Deviation was the dependent variable. Clinical was coded as 0 if 
participants were in the mechanical or hybrid condition, and 1 if participants were in the 
clinical condition. Hybrid was coded as 0 if participants were in the mechanical or 
clinical condition, and 1 if participants were in the hybrid condition. 
* p < .05. 
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Table 12. Regression Results of Statistically Significant Individual Differences x Source 
Interactions When Predicting Judgment Accuracy 
Individual 
Differences   B SE B β 
Experience Clinical -.01 .01 -.05 
 Hybrid -.02 .01 -.08* 
 Experience -.03 .01 -.19*** 
 Clinical x Experience .03 .01 .10* 
 Hybrid x Experience .02 .01 .09 
 R2 .02   
 F 3.62**   
Cognitive  Clinical -.02 .01 -.06 
Ability Hybrid -.02 .01 -.08* 
 Experience .00 .01 .03 
 
Clinical x Cognitive 
Ability .03 .01 .12** 
 
Hybrid x Cognitive 
Ability .01 .01 .02 
 R2 .02   
 F 5.28***   
Unfairness Clinical -.02 .01 -.06 
 Hybrid -.02 .01 -.08* 
 Experience .01 .01 .09 
 Clinical x Unfairness -.03 .01 -.12** 
 Hybrid x Unfairness -.01 .01 -.05 
 R2 .01   
 F 2.56*   
Unusefulness Clinical -.02 .01 -.06 
 Hybrid -.02 .01 -.08* 
 Experience .01 .01 .10 
 Clinical x Unusefulness -.04 .01 -.15*** 
 Hybrid x Unusefulness -.02 .01 -.07 
 R2 .02   
  F 3.55**     
Note. Clinical was coded as 0 if participants were in the mechanical or hybrid condition, 
and 1 if participants were in the clinical condition. Hybrid was coded as 0 if participants 
were in the mechanical or clinical condition, and 1 if participants were in the hybrid 
condition. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001 
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Figure 1. Judgment accuracy, response consistency, and magnitude of anchoring between 
participants who received anchors and participants who did not receive anchors.  
Standard errors are represented in the figure by the error bars attached to each column. 
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Figure 2. The clinical x precise interaction for judgment accuracy.  
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Figure 3. The clinical x precise interaction for relative accuracy. 
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Figure 4. The clinical x precise interaction for linear knowledge. 
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Figure 5. The clinical x precise interaction for response consistency. 
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Figure 6. Relationship between relative accuracy and average deviation. 
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Appendix A 
Prior Experience with Employee Selection 
Concerning your experience evaluating job candidates and making hiring decisions, how 
often have you …  
 
 Never A few times 
Somewhat 
often Often 
Very 
often 
reviewed/evaluated 
application materials ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ 
conducted unstructured 
employment interviews ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ 
performed reference 
checks ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ 
conducted structured 
employment interviews ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ 
reviewed/evaluated 
samples of work behavior 
(e.g., simulations) 
¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ 
reviewed/evaluated 
profiles posted on social 
networking websites (e.g., 
LinkedIn) 
¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ 
administered or reviewed 
the results of personality 
inventories 
¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ 
administered or reviewed 
the results of intelligence 
tests 
¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ 
been the person who is 
ultimately responsible for 
making a hiring decision 
¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ 
 
Nolan et al. (2016) 
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Appendix B 
Cognitive Ability Items 
Verbal Reasoning 
 
V1. Please mark the word that does not match the other words: 
(1) Sycamore (2) Buckeye (3) Elm (4) Daffodil (5) Hickory (6) Sequoia (7) They all 
match (8) I don't know 
 
V2. The opposite of a "stubborn" person is a "_____" person. 
(1) Flexible (2) Passionate (3) Mediocre (4) Reserved (5) Pigheaded (6) Persistent (7) 
None of these (8) I don't know 
 
V3. Adam and Melissa went fly-fishing and caught a total of 32 salmon. Melissa caught 
three times as many salmon as Adam. How many salmon did Adam catch? 
(1) 7 (2) 8 (3) 9 (4) 10 (5) 11 (6) 12 (7) None of these (8) I don't know 
 
V4. Zach is taller than Matt and Richard is shorter than Zach. Which of the following 
statements would be most accurate? 
(1) Richard is taller than Matt (2) Richard is shorter than Matt (3) Richard is as tall as 
Matt (4) It's impossible to tell (5) Richard is taller than Zach (6) Zach is shorter than Matt 
(7) None of these (8) I don't know 
 
V5. If the day after tomorrow is two days before Thursday then what day is it today? 
(1) Friday (2) Monday (3) Wednesday (4) Saturday (5) Tuesday (6) Sunday (7) None of 
these (8) I don't know 
 
V6. Please mark the word that does not match the other words: 
(1) Buenos Aires (2) Melbourne (3) Seattle (4) Cairo (5) Morocco (6) Milan (7) None of 
these (8) I don't know 
 
V7. The opposite of an "affable" person is a(n) "_____" person. 
(1) Angry (2) Sociable (3) Gracious (4) Frustrated (5) Reserved (6) Ungrateful (7) None 
of these (8) I don't know 
 
V8. Isaac is shorter than George and Phillip is taller than George. Which of the following 
statements is most accurate? 
(1) Phillip is taller than Isaac (2) Phillip is shorter than Isaac (3) Phillip is as tall as Isaac 
(4) It is impossible to tell (5) Isaac is taller than George (6) George is taller than Phillip 
(7) None of these (8) I don't know 
 
V9. If the day before yesterday is three days after Saturday then what day is today? 
(1) Thursday (2) Saturday (3) Wednesday (4) Friday (5) Sunday (6) Tuesday (7) None of 
these (8) I don't know 
		 100 
 
V10. The opposite of an "ambiguous" situation is a(n) "_____" situation. 
(1) suspicious (2) vague (3) unequivocal (4) intelligent (5) dubious (6) genuine (7) None 
of these (8) I don't know 
 
Numerical Reasoning 
 
In the following number series, what number comes next? 
 
1) 124,115,106,97,… 
 
2) 85,73,61,49,… 
 
3) 73,55,37,19,… 
 
4) 115,99,83,67,… 
 
5) 200,166,132,98,… 
 
6) 71,65,72,66,73,67,… 
 
7) 23,37,24,38,25,39,… 
 
8) 34,150,35,160,36,170,… 
 
9) 5,16,38,71,115,… 
 
10) 10,24,39,55,72,… 
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Appendix C 
General Decision-Making Style 
The rational style emphasizes a thorough search for and logical evaluation of alternatives. 
1. I double-check my information sources to be sure I have the right facts before 
making decisions. 
2. I make decisions in a logical and systematic way. 
3. My decision making requires careful thought. 
4. When making a decision, I consider various options in terms of a specified goal. 
5. I explore all of my options before making a decision. 
 
The avoidant style emphasizes postponing and avoiding decisions. 
1. I put off making decisions because thinking about them makes me uneasy. 
2. I avoid making important decisions until the pressure is on. 
3. I postpone decision making whenever possible. 
4. I often procrastinate when it comes to making important decisions. 
5. I generally make important decisions at the last minute. 
 
The dependent style emphasizes a search for advice and direction from others. 
1. I rarely make important decisions without consulting other people. 
2. I use the advice of other people in making my important decisions. 
3. I like to have someone steer me in the right direction when I am faced with 
important decisions. 
4. I often need the assistance of other people when making important decisions. 
5. If I have the support of others, it is easier for me to make important decisions. 
 
The intuitive style emphasizes a reliance on hunches and feelings. 
1. When I make decisions, I tend to rely on my intuition. 
2. When I make a decision, it is more important for me to feel the decision is right 
than to have a rational reason for it. 
3. When making a decision, I trust my inner feelings and reactions. 
4. When making decisions, I rely upon my instincts. 
5. I generally make decisions that feel right to me. 
 
The spontaneous style emphasizes a sense of immediacy and a desire to get through the 
decision-making process as soon as possible. 
1. When making decisions I do what feels natural at the moment. 
2. I generally make snap decisions. 
3. I often make impulsive decisions. 
4. I often make decisions on the spur of the moment. 
5. I make quick decisions. 
 
 (Scott & Bruce, 1995)  
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Appendix D 
Resistance to Scientific Personnel Selection Methods 
 
Please answer the questions as honestly as possible. We are interested in your opinions 
about these issues. Some of the questions ask about your preferences when making hiring 
decisions. Even if you do not currently make hiring decisions, please imagine how you 
believe you would feel if you needed to make a hiring decision. 
 
1 = strongly disagree 
2 = disagree 
3 = neither agree nor disagree 
4 = agree 
5 = strongly agree 
 
Fairness of Algorithms   
Hiring algorithms under-predict job performance for racial minorities 
Hiring algorithms discriminate against racial minorities 
Hiring algorithms are racially biased 
Racial minorities are disadvantaged by hiring algorithms 
Using hiring algorithms to make hiring decisions is unfair to racial minorities 
 
Fairness of Standardized Tests 
Standardized test scores under-predict job performance for racial minorities 
Standardized tests discriminate against racial minorities 
Standardized tests are racially biased 
Racial minorities are disadvantaged by standardized tests 
Using standardized tests to make hiring decisions is unfair to racial minorities 
 
Usefulness of Algorithms  
Hiring algorithms are not valid for selecting employees 
Hiring algorithms do not have value when selecting employees 
Hiring algorithms are unreliable for selecting employees 
Hiring algorithms do not provide meaningful information about people 
Hiring algorithms are useless for selecting employees 
 
Usefulness of Tests 
Standardized test scores are not valid for selecting employees 
Standardized test scores do not have value when selecting employees 
Standardized tests are unreliable for selecting employees 
Standardized tests do not provide meaningful information about people 
Standardized tests are useless for selecting employees 
  
		 103 
Appendix E 
Background Information and Validity Check Questions 
 
Instruction: Please read the following information carefully. It describes the decision 
scenario you will encounter in the next section and the data you will use to make 
subsequent decisions. It is important that you read it carefully prior to proceeding to the 
next section. 
 
You will answer a few questions on the next page to test if you have read the background 
information carefully. 
 
An increasing concern among organizations is to reduce counterproductive work 
behavior.  
 
Counterproductive work behaviors include (but are not limited to): 
• Theft 
• Destruction of property 
• Unsafe behaviors 
• Poor quality work (intentionally slow or sloppy work) 
• Turnover 
• Lateness 
• Absenteeism 
• Drug and alcohol use 
• Workplace violence 
• Sexual harassment 
 
One solution is to estimate individuals' integrity scores based on their personality scores. 
• Individuals with higher integrity scores are less likely to engage in 
counterproductive work behaviors. 
 
Your task in the next section:  
• Evaluate the extent to which an individual is likely to exhibit counterproductive 
work behaviors based on his or her personality scores on five aspects.  
• The data you will use to make predictions are from a real employment data set 
containing personality scores and integrity scores of real employees at an 
organization, we are able to estimate the accuracy of your predictions. 
o If your accuracy is in the top 25% of individuals who have participated in 
the study, you will receive a bonus of 1 dollar. 
 
Here are the definitions for each personality score you will encounter: 
 
Extraversion 
The extent to which an individual is sociable, gregarious, assertive, talkative, and active. 
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Agreeableness 
The extent to which an individual is compassionate and cooperative rather than 
suspicious and antagonistic towards others.  
 
Openness 
The extent to which an individual is intellectually curious, creative, imaginative, and 
prefer novelty and variety.  
 
Emotional Stability 
The extent to which an individual is calm and emotionally resilient. Individuals high on 
this are less likely to experience negative emotions. 
 
Conscientiousness 
The extent to which an individual is careful, thorough, responsible, organized, 
hardworking, and achievement-oriented. 
 
There is scientific evidence that individuals who are higher on Agreeableness, Emotional 
Stability, and, especially, Conscientiousness are also higher on integrity and therefore 
are less likely to engage in counterproductive work behaviors. 
 
Validity Check Questions 
 
1. Is the following statement TRUE or FALSE? 
 
Examples of counterproductive work behaviors include: poor quality work, 
absenteeism, turnover, unsafe behaviors, theft, workplace violence, drug and 
alcohol use, and sexual harassment. 
 
¡ True 
¡ False 
 
2. Is an individual with a higher integrity score less likely, or more likely, to engage 
in counterproductive work behaviors? 
 
¡ Less likely 
¡ More likely 
 
3. Which of the following is a characteristic of individuals who are high on 
Extraversion? 
 
¡ Intellectually curious 
¡ Talkative 
¡ Compassionate 
¡ Hardworking 
¡ Calm 
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4. Which of the following is a characteristic of individuals who are high on 
Agreeableness? 
 
¡ Intellectually curious 
¡ Talkative 
¡ Compassionate 
¡ Hardworking 
¡ Calm 
 
5. Which of the following is a characteristic of individuals who are high on 
Openness? 
 
¡ Intellectually curious 
¡ Talkative 
¡ Compassionate 
¡ Hardworking 
¡ Calm 
 
6. Which of the following is a characteristic of individuals who are high on 
Emotional Stability? 
 
¡ Intellectually curious 
¡ Talkative 
¡ Compassionate 
¡ Hardworking 
¡ Calm 
 
7. Which of the following is a characteristic of individuals who are high on 
Conscientiousness? 
 
¡ Intellectually curious 
¡ Talkative 
¡ Compassionate 
¡ Hardworking 
¡ Calm 
 
 
8. Individuals who are higher on which of the following personality aspects are less 
likely to engage in counterproductive work behaviors? (Select all that apply) 
 
¨ Extraversion 
¨ Agreeableness 
¨ Openness 
¨ Emotional Stability 
¨ Conscientiousness  
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Appendix F 
Sample Item (Mechanical, High-Precision Condition) 
 
Your task in this section is to predict the integrity score of an individual based on his or 
her personality scores.  
ð There is scientific evidence that individuals who are higher on Agreeableness, 
Emotional Stability, and, especially, Conscientiousness are also higher on 
integrity. 
ð An individual with a higher integrity score is less likely to exhibit 
counterproductive work behaviors.  
 
Click here for definitions for counterproductive work behavior and each personality score 
If the link does not work, check your popup blocker 
 
Below are the personality scores for Mark: 
 (On a scale from 0 to 100) 
 
84.9 Extraversion 
53.0 Agreeableness 
99.6 Openness 
29.1 Emotional Stability 
15.7 Conscientiousness 
 
Here is how to interpret the personality scores: 
  
A higher score means the individual has a stronger tendency on that trait. 
 
To guide your judgment, below is a prediction obtained by applying a pre-determined 
formula to combine the five personality scores.  
• There is scientific evidence that an estimate derived through this method is highly 
accurate, but you are free to make adjustment based on the personality scores. 
 
The predicted integrity score based on the formula for Mark is: 64.8 (on a scale from 0 
to 100) 
		 107 
 
Here is how to interpret the integrity score: 
 
A higher score means the individual is less likely to engage in counterproductive work 
behaviors. 
 
1. Do you think the predicted integrity score of 64.8 based on the formula for Mark is 
too high, too low, or just appropriate? 
 
     ¡          ¡     ¡ 
Too High    Too Low   Just Appropriate 
  
 
2. Please provide your judgment of the integrity score for Mark based on the personality 
scores: (on a scale from 0 to 100 where 0 = very likely to exhibit counterproductive work 
behaviors and 100 = very unlikely to exhibit counterproductive work behaviors) 
 
_________ 
 
3. Please indicate your confidence in your judgment on the following scale: 
 
         0          1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
Not at all confident     Extremely confident 
 
 
